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PRIVATE ORDERING AT THE WORLD'S 
FIRST FUTURES EXCHANGE 
Mark D. West* 
INTRODUCTION 
Modern derivative securities - financial instruments whose value 
is linked to or "derived" from some other asset - are often sophisti­
cated, complex, and subject to a variety of rules and regulations. The 
same is true of the derivative instruments traded at the world's first 
organized futures exchange, the Dojima Rice Exchange in Osaka, 
Japan, where trade flourished for nearly 300 years, from the late sev­
enteenth century until shortly before World War II. This Article 
analyzes Dojima's organization, efficiency, and amalgam of legal and 
extralegal rules. In doing so, it contributes to a growing body of litera­
ture on commercial self-regulation1 while shedding new light on three 
areas of legal and economic theory. 
First, unlike participants in many other studied markets, Dojima 
traders did not opt out of the legal system. Like other parties to dis­
crete transactions in early modern Japan, Dojima traders were forced 
out by the shogunate government. Although participants operated in 
the shadow of latent state regulation, the government remained 
largely hands-off by, most importantly, denying legal enforceability of 
futures contracts. The distinction between opting out of and being 
forced from the legal system is more than historical curiosity. In a re­
cent article, for instance, Lynn Stout argued in the context of modern 
over-the-counter derivative markets that private ordering can be supe­
rior when parties "are involuntarily shut out" of the legal system.2 
Thus, she advocates the decriminalization of off-exchange derivative 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. - Ed. I thank Brian 
Balyeat, Stuart Banner, Chris Boehning, Atsushi Kinami, Rick Lempert, Ronald Mann, 
Curtis Milhaupt, Bill Miller, Adam Pritchard, Mark Ramseyer, Brian Simpson, Lynn Stout, 
Hitomi Tonomura, and Omri Yadlin. The Nippon Life Insurance Company's endowment at 
the University of Michigan Law School provided generous support. 
1. See, e.g., Stuart Banner, The Origin of the New York Stock Exchange, 1791-1860, 27 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 113 {1998); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Con­
tractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 {1992); Robert C. 
Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Whaling Industry, 
5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83 {1989); Stephen Craig Pirrong, The Efficient Scope of Private 
Transactions-Cost-Reducing Institlltions: The Successes and Failures of Commodities Ex­
changes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 229 {1995); Mark D. West, Legal Rules and Social Norms in 
Japan's Secret World of Sumo, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 {1997). 
2. Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in 
the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE LJ. 701, 777-83 {1999). 
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trading, but rejects civil enforceability of such contracts - the exact 
approach adopted in Japan three centuries ago. Similarly, in early 
2000, the chairman of the Federal Reserve, the Treasury Secretary, 
and the chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
called on Congress to exempt over-the-counter derivatives from the 
Commodity Exchange Act.3 Dojima provides an empirical basis for 
analyzing these regulatory approaches, as well as more general pro­
posals for exchange self-regulation.4 
Second, this Article explores claims made by others that legal in­
tervention can improve the welfare of market participants only when 
participants have poor judgment or face high drafting costs.5 Absent 
these circumstances, legal intervention hurts participants. After 
nearly half a century of forced reliance by Dojima participants on ex­
tralegal arrangements, the shogunate in 1773 temporarily made fu­
tures contracts enforceable in court. Comparison of pre- and post-
1773 Dojima market indicators thus offers a unique opportunity to 
analyze the market-wide effects of legal intervention. 
Third, unlike the bartered exchange transactions (among, for in­
stance, ranchers, whalers, and diamond merchants) that provide the 
basis of much recent scholarship, derivatives transactions can be quite 
complex. Because losses from derivative trading are not limited to the 
amount invested, huge losses may result - as recent billion-dollar 
losses at Barings Bank, Metallgesellschaft, Orange County, and 
Sumitomo Corporation demonstrate. This Article is the first to ex­
amine extralegal rules arising from such complex transactions. Be­
cause the Exchange data lend themselves to accepted econometric 
techniques, this Article also attempts to calculate rough measures of 
market efficiency. 
In addition, while I do not claim that this Article supplants the ex­
cellent work of Japanese economic historians on Dojima,6 it is one of 
3. See Gerard Baker, Greenspan Wants Derivatives Freed Up, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2000, 
at 11. 
4. See, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453 (1997) 
(proposing self-regulation); A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace 
Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925 (1999) 
(same); see also Tokushii, Rekishi ni Manabu "Shijo" tai "Kokka" [Special Issue: Lessons 
from History on the Market Versus the State], PRESIDENT 251 (Nov. 1999) (series of articles 
focusing on Dojima in Japanese business magazine). 
5. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); David Chamy, Nonlegal Sanc­
tions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 375, 429-44 (1990). 
6. See, e.g., NORITAKA Dom, KOME TO EDO JIDAI [RICE AND THE TOKUGAWA ERA] 
(1980); MATAO MIYAMOTO, KlNSEI NIHON NO SHIJO KEIZAI (EARLY MODERN JAPANESE 
MARKET ECONOMICS] (1988); TOKUICID SIDMAMOTO, TOKUGAWA JIDAI NO SHOKEN 
SHIJO NO KENKYO (REsEARCH ON TOKUGAWA ERA SECURITIES MARKETS] (1953); 
MASAIDKO SUGIB, TOKI TO SAKIMONO TORIHIKI NO RlRON: WAGA KUNI SAKIMONO 
TORIHIKI SEIDO NO SEIRITSU NI KANSURU KENKYO (THEORY OF SPECULATION AND 
FORWARDS TRANSACTIONS: REsEARCH ON THE EsTABLISHMENT OF FORWARDS 
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the very few works on Dojima available in English,7 and the first in 
any language to place Dojima in context using a law-and-economics 
methodology. Although the study of early modern Japanese institu­
tions can be daunting (in this Article, for instance, I rely heavily on 
eighteenth-century documents written, unfortunately, in eighteenth­
century Japanese), the gap in the literature is remarkable nonetheless. 
Dojima merits obligatory mention in virtually every popular work, in­
troductory textbook, and law review article on derivatives and mar­
kets as "the world's first organized futures market."8 Moreover, 
Dojima development bears striking resemblance to that of early 
Western markets, suggesting that similar private-ordering systems 
tend to arise in similar institutional environments - independent of 
social structures, cultural constraints, and (arguably) Western concep­
tions of contract, norms, and reputation. 
I am the first to acknowledge the sketchiness of some of the 300-
year-old evidence from early modern Japan. But the best evidence 
available, which I have attempted to assemble here, leads to two cen­
tral claims. First, Exchange participants appear to have developed ef­
fective means of discipline, governance, and dispute settlement, with 
only minimal "shadow-of-regulation" input from the state. Second, 
the Dojima Rice Exchange appears to have performed well when fu­
tures trading was illegal, when it was made legal but contracts were le­
gally unenforceable, and when contracts were legally enforceable. 
The government's decision to make futures contracts legally enforce­
able appears not to have dramatically increased - or for that matter 
decreased - several market performance measures. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets forth the history of the 
Exchange, describes trading mechanics and regulation, and discusses 
TRANSACTIONS IN JAPAN] (1984); Takatoshi Ito, 18 Seiki, Dojima no Kame Sakimono Shijii 
no Kiiritsusei ni Tsuite [Regarding the Efficiency of the 18th Century Dojima Futures Market], 
44 KEIZAI KENKYO 339 (1993); Shigeru Wakita, Kinsei Osaka Dojima Kame Sakimono 
Shijii ni Okeru Giiriteki Kitai no Seiritsu [The Establishment of Rational Expectations in the 
Early Modern Dojima Rice Futures Market in Osaka], 47 KEIZAI KENKYD 238 (1996). 
7. A search of U.S. scholarship reveals only one article: Ulrike Schaede, Fonvards and 
Futures in Tokugawa-Period Japan: A New Perspective on the Diijima Rice Market, 13 J. 
BANK. & FIN. 487 (1989) [hereinafter Schaede, Forwards and Futures]. A slightly different 
version appears as Ulrike Schaede, The Development of Organized Futures Trading: The 
Osaka Rice Bill Market of 1730, in JAPANESE FINANCIAL MARKET REsEARCH 339 f.>V.T. 
Ziemba et al. eds., 1991). Each is largely a finance-centered description of trading mechan­
ics. In this Article, in addition to adopting a different methodology, I rely on data and 
sources not examined by Schaede and sources not available at the time of that article's pub­
lication. 
8. PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK 306 
(1996); BARBARA B. DIAMOND & MARK P. KOLLAR, 24-HOUR TRADING: THE GLOBAL 
NETWORK OF FlmJREs AND OPTIONS MARKETS 6-9 (1989); JERRY W. MARKHAM, THE 
HISTORY OF COMMODITY FlmJREs TRADING AND ITS REGULATION 3 (1987); RICHARD J. 
TEWELES & F'RANKJ. JONES, THE FlmJREs GAME: WHO WINS? WHO LOSES? WHY? 8-9 
(2d ed. 1987); Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their 
Regulation, 55 Mn. L. REV. 1, 10 (1996). 
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reasons why the world's first organized futures exchange began at 
Dojima and not elsewhere. Part II discusses the governance and anti­
manipulation institutions of the Exchange and analyzes Dojima's rela­
tive reliance on formal internal rules rather than informal constraints. 
Part III attempts to measure the efficiency of the institutions discussed 
in Parts I and II by using price data gathered from eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century Japanese documents. Part IV examines the effect 
of state-provided dispute resolution at Dojima by comparing dispute 
resolution and performance measures at Dojima before, during, and 
after the period in which shogunate courts were open to Dojima suits 
(1773-1784). 
I. THE MARKET 
A. Economic, Social, and Legal Setting 
Around 1600, Ieyasu Tokugawa led a coalition of local lords to vic­
tory in battle and established a Japanese national dynasty that would 
last until the Meiji Restoration of 1868. Though Tokugawa Japan is 
generally characterized as isolationist and peaceful,9 recent scholarship 
casts doubt on strong isolationist claims, noting that most Europeans 
left on their own after losing a trade war to the D11tch, and that Japan 
was always open to trade with other Asian countries.10 But peaceful it 
certainly appears to have been, as the Tokugawa unification marked 
the end of 100 years of civil war and a prelude to the dramatic changes 
that would occur in the Western-influenced late-nineteenth century. 
With peace came growth in population, cities, and commerce. Edo 
(modem-day Tokyo) became the country's political center, while 
Osaka - the "country's kitchen" - became the commercial center. 
Unlike many other feudal societies, Japan enjoyed a flourishing mar­
ket economy, a development attributable to a combination of restric­
tions on foreign trade, a fragmented political system of 250 economi­
cally interdependent feudal domains, and the need of feudal leaders to 
fund expensive, centrally mandated trips to Edo every two years under 
a system of alternate residence.11 Economic specialization increased, 
9. See, e.g., WALTER LEFEBER, THE CLASH: A HISTORY OF U.S.-JAPANESE 
RELATIONS 8 (1997); PATRICK SMITH, JAPAN: A REINTERPRETATION 53 (1997); TETSURO 
WATSUJI, SAKOKU: NIHON NO HIGEKI [NATIONAL ISOLATION: THE TRAGEDY OF JAPAN] 
(1953). 
10. See, e.g., RONALD P. TOBY, STATE AND DIPLOMACY IN EARLY MODERN JAPAN: 
ASIA IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOKUGAWA BAKUFU (1984); Kazui Tashiro, Foreign 
Relations During the Edo Period: Sakoku Reexamined, 8 J. JAPANESE STUD. 283 (Susan 
Downing Videen trans., 1982); Robert LeRoy Innes, The Door Ajar: Japan's Foreign Trade 
in the Seventeenth Century (1980) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan) 
(on file with author). 
11. See, e.g., YASUNARI MARUYAMA, NIHON KINSEI KOTSOSHI NO KENKYO [STUDY 
OF TRANSPORTATION HISTORY IN EARLY MODERN JAPAN] 585-600 (1989); Kenji Date, 
2578 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 98:2574 
and the port city of Osaka, located near many large rice fields, became 
a center of agricultural commerce and industry. 
The Tokugawa government did not rely on a single currency, but 
three - gold coin (mostly used in Eastern Japan), silver currency (by 
weight, mostly used in Western Japan, including Osaka), and copper 
coin (used nationwide). But currency demand outpaced production, 
due at least in part to the Tokugawa government's monopoly over 
gold and silver mines. Local domains turned to substitutes, often 
minting their own currency.12 Sometimes financial instruments such as 
promissory notes, bills of exchange, and letters of credit also filled the 
gap.13 
In part because of its availability and ease of measurement, rice 
became a substitute currency.14 Rice, "the most important commodity 
in Tokugawa society,''15 was the measure by which the shogunate fig­
ured its annual budget.16 Many feudal lords collected taxes from peas­
ant subjects in rice and financed their governments by converting rice 
into currency at markets. Domain lords stored their rice in ware­
houses in Osaka, and, in a preliminary step toward the creation of an 
organized marketplace, paid Osaka merchants to manage it as their 
agents.17 
The relative social status of the feudal lords and warehouse mer­
chants was quite clear. Tokugawa society was divided into four he­
reditary vocational status groups, in descending order: samurai, farm-
Edo ni Okeru Shoko no Keihi Seikatsu ni Tsuite [The Consumptive Life of Edo Period Feu­
dal Lords], 4 REKISHIGAKU KENKYO 75 {1935). 
12 See YOTARO SAKUDO, NIHON KAREi KIN'YOSHI NO KENKYO: HOKEN SHAKAI NO 
SHIN'YO TSUKA NI KANSURU KISOTEKI KENKYO [A STUDY OF THE HISTORY OF JAPANESE 
CURRENCY IN FEUDAL SOCIETY] 33-58 {1961); Sydney Crawcour, The Development of a 
Credit System in Seventeenth-Century Japan, 21 J. ECON. HIST. 342 {1961). 
13. Bills of credit first appeared in Osaka in 1628. See MATAJI MIYAMOTO, OSAKA 
CHONIN [OSAKA MERCHANTS] 41-44 {1957); see also SUSUMU KITAHARA, EDO NO 
FUDASASlil [TOKYO MONEYLENDERS] 7-8 {1985); Masaru Iwahashi, Tokugawa Jidai no 
Kahei Surya [Currency Distribution in the Tokugawa Era] in NIHON KEIZAI NO HATTEN 
[nm DEVELOPMENT OF JAPANESE ECONOMICS] {Mataji Umemura et al. eds., 1976). Bills 
of exchange are said to have begun in Europe in the late twelfth century. See Meir Kohn, 
Bills of Exchange and the Money Market to 1600, in MEIR KOHN, FINANCE, BUSINESS, AND 
GOVERNMENT BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION {forthcoming 2000) (manuscript at 
1, on file with author and available at http://www.sm.com). 
14. For an eloquent description of rice as pure commodity, see BERTOLT BRECHT, The 
Measures Taken, in THE MEASURES TAKEN, AND OTHER LEHRSTOCKE 23-24 (Carl R. 
Mueller et al. trans., 1997) {"What is rice anyway?/Do I know what rice is?/How should I 
know who should know? /I don't know what rice is./ All I know is its price."). 
15. Tsuneo Sato, Tokugawa Villages and Agriculture, in TOKUGAWA JAPAN: THE 
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ANTECEDENTS OF MODERN JAPAN 37, 73 (Chie Nakane & 
Shinzaburo Oishi eds., 1990). 
16. See FuYUn DOMON, Eno SHONIN NO KEIZAIGAKU [THE ECONOMICS OF 
TOKUGAWA MERCHANTS] 9 {1996). 
17. See OSAMU WAKITA, KINSEi HOKEN SHAKAI NO KEIZAI KOZO [THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF EARLY MODERN FEUDAL SOCIETY] 23-36 {1963). 
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ers, artisans, and merchants. The merchant status group was not 
monolithic, including both merchant property owners and day labor­
ers. But merchants were clearly at the bottom of the social hierarchy, 
above only the extremely underprivileged, and were often subject to 
persecution from above by feudal lords in the form of asset confisca­
tion and from below by peasants in the form of arson and theft.18 
The Tokugawa legal system was one of fragmented federalism.19 
Tokugawa law applied in principle only in territory controlled directly 
by the central government, or perhaps more precisely, the Tokugawa 
feudal lord - about one-third of Japan, which included Osaka. The 
remainder of Japan was governed by a hodgepodge of feudal laws, the 
only guiding principle being a supremacy clause of sorts that man­
dated (in 1615) local statutes not contravene those of the govem­
ment.20 While property rights were not afforded statutory protection, 
local domains enforced "de facto property rights."21 Spotted use of le­
gal precedents may have occurred in some regions,22 but it was not un­
til 1742 that important statutes and precedents were assembled into a 
code.23 
By most accounts, dispute resolution was hierarchical, individualis­
tic, and unpredictable. The judicial system relied on the Tokugawa 
social structure to control and channel disputes. Disputants first 
brought their claims to the local village leader and were referred to 
the next level in the hierarchy only if they could not be resolved in the 
first instance. The government explicitly discouraged suits against su­
periors or against members of another social status group, perhaps to 
preclude pgtential threats to its sovereignty.24 The primary goals of 
those in charge of the legal system appear to have been settlement and 
the maintenance of social order, goals made more attainable by the in-
18. See, e.g., JOHN G. ROBERTS, MITSUI: THREE CENTURIES OF JAPANESE BUSINESS 
36 (2d ed. 1988). 
19. See J. MARK RAMSEYER, ODD MARKETS IN JAPANESE HISTORY: LAW AND 
ECONOMIC GROWlll 18 (1996). 
20. See, e.g., M!NJI KANREI RUISHO [COLLECTION OF Civ1L LAWS] (Yutaka Tezuka & 
Mitsuo Riko eds., 1969); HARuo OKUBO, EDO NO KErnO OSADAMEGAKI HYAKKAJO 
[CRIMINAL PROVISIONS OF TOKUGAWA ERA OSADAMEGAKI] (1978); CARL STEENSTRUP, 
A HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN UNTIL 1868, at 121 (1991). 
21. Tetsuji Okazaki & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, Evolution of Economic Systems: The 
Case of Japan, in THE INSTITUTIONS OF EAST AsIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 482, 494 
(Yujiro Hayami & Masahiko Aoki eds., 1998). 
22. See Yoshiro Hiramatsu, KinseihO [Early Modem Law], in 11 Iw ANAMI KOZA NIBON 
REKISHI [IWANAMI SERIES ON JAPANESE HISTORY] 331, 341-42 (1976). 
23. This code was in the form of the Osadamegaki. See DAN FENNO HENDERSON, 1 
CONCILIATION AND JAPANESE LAW: TOKUGAWA AND MODERN 15-16 (1965). 
24. See Dan F. Henderson, Some Aspects of Tokugawa Law, 27 WASH. L. REV. 85, 92 
(1952). 
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termingling of civil and criminal law - civil litigants might face such 
novel sanctions as beheading for refusing to settle.25 
B. Beginnings 
Dojima's story begins in 1616 - four years before the Mayflower 
left England, and fifteen years after the arrival in Japan of Englishman 
William Adams (the character fictionalized in James Clavell's Shogun) 
- when a rice merchant from Nagoya (located halfway between 
Osaka and Edo) named Chozaemon takes a trip to Edo. According to 
the traditional - which does not necessarily mean historically accu­
rate - story, along the way to Edo, Chozaemon stops at an inn where 
he meets a traveler from Sendai (north of Edo ). Chozaemon strikes a 
deal with the man: you tell me if there's a rice shortage up North; I'll 
tell you if there's one down South. Five years later, on his pilgrimage 
to the Ise Shrine, the man from the North visits Chozaemon in Nagoya 
and informs him that this year's northern harvest looks bleak; next 
year it looks as if the North will send to Tokyo only half of its usual 
crop. Chozaemon begins hoarding rice from that year's southern 
bumper crop. A fellow Nagoyan named Ichizaemon hears of 
Chozaemon's efforts, and asks him to purchase 500 ryo worth of rice 
on his behalf. Chozaemon is eager to help, but because he has no 
warehouse to store that much rice on top of his own, he makes a deal. 
Pay me just 60 ryo now, he says, and when I sell the rice next year, 
you'll pay me the remaining 440 ryo along with interest at the rate of 3 
sho (about a pound) of rice, and I'll give you the profits., But if the 
price of rice falls, and it's not profitable to sell, I'll keep your 60 ryo. 
Fortunately for both, the price skyrockets. Chozaemon realizes that 
he can do this again, and does so regularly, issuing 100 ryo of rice "re­
ceipts" for a two percent down payment, taking a middleman's fee, 
and setting contract maturity dates of two to three months.26 
In the following years, several feudal lords begin to follow 
Chozaemon's example, issuing rice receipts that entitle the bearer to 
rice from the lords' agent-managed Osaka warehouses. By issuing re­
ceipts, lords could ensure a steady income stream from their otherwise 
seasonal and weather-dependent product. Like other promissory 
notes or bills of exchange that would dominate the Tokugawa mer­
chant economy,27 the receipts entitled the bearer to a certain quantity 
of goods - rice in an Osaka warehouse. But unlike other goods on 
25. See, e.g., HENDERSON, supra note 23, at 101, 132-62 (noting that "criminal-civil dis­
tinction was not clearly observed and Tokugawa practice" and including transcript of civil 
suit in which local official routinely threatens death penalty). 
26. See Dom, supra note 6, at 32-33; SUGIE, supra note 6, at 8-9. 
27. By the end of the Tokugawa period, 99% of payments between merchants were set­
tled by bills. See SAKUDO, supra note 12, at 249. 
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which promissory notes or bills of exchange were based, rice was itself 
a form of currency, and accordingly, these rice receipts, or bills, soon 
acquired a currency-like quality with a value independent of the un­
derlying physical rice. Warehouses routinely issued "empty" bills 
(kiimai kitte) that were traded as credit instruments rather than actual 
entitlements to physical rice, which did not exist in the issuing ware­
house.28 Records of the Osaka city commissioner show that by 1654 
(and perhaps several years earlier), Osaka traders had formed a func­
tioning market for these rice bills.29 
The trading house of Saburaemon Y odoya, in the Kitahama dis­
trict of Osaka, became the primary trading site for rice bills. 30 As 
!hara Saikaku, the son of an Osaka merchant and one of Japan's most 
gifted novelists, wrote some 300 years ago: 
The Kitahama Rice Market, as is fitting of Osaka's position as the largest 
port in Japan, sometimes had speculative transactions of 50,000 kan [42.6 
tons] in a two-hour period. The rice was crammed to the tops of the 
warehouses. People bought and sold by speculating based on the condi­
tion of the sky, the evening winds, and the morning rains. They argued 
over a mere one or two bu of silver, the market was full of people, and 
people who had never met before would trade thousands or even ten 
thousands of koku of rice, and once they had clapped hands over it, nei­
ther party would breach the contract.31 
Saikaku's prose suggests a glorious market of which the state might 
have been proud. But authorities' initial larger concern was urban 
congestion, as traffic jams on Kitahama Road outside of the House of 
Y odoya were a common occurrence. In 1688 the government re­
quested that rice traders move their market across the river to Dojima 
(today a few blocks from Osaka Station). They complied, and in 1697 
Yodoya moved to Dojima as well.32 
In 1705, the shogunate closed Y odoya's business and confiscated 
his assets.33 The official reason for the shogunate's action was 
Yodoya's criminal violation of sumptuary laws by ostentatious dis-
28. See, e.g. , SHIMAMOTO, supra note 6, at 14-15. 
29. See SAKUDO, supra note 12, at 345. 
30. Although many sources cite Yodoya as the birthplace of futures trading, it is possi­
ble that Yodoya was one of several trading sites. See SUGIE, supra note 6, at 12. 
31. IHARA SAIKAKU, NIPPON EITAIGURA [JAPAN'S ETERNAL STOREHOUSE] (1688), 
quoted in YAMATANE GROUP KINEN SHUPPANKAI, NIHON SHI.JOSHI [HISTORY OF 
JAPANESE MARKETS] 62 (1989). 
32 See, e.g. , MIYAMOTO, supra note 6, at 196. 
33. Yodoya's wealth was astounding; if the commonly cited inventory of his wealth is 
accurate, he was a thousand times richer than other merchants, was owed 100 million ryii 
(several times the national income of Japan), and the amount confiscated by the government 
was equal to two hundred years of shogunate income. See, e.g., E.S. Crawcour, Changes in 
Japanese Commerce in the Tokugawa Period, 22 J. ASIAN STUD. 387, 392 (1962). 
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plays of wealth.34 But some scholars suggest that Yodoya had been 
overeager in enforcing loans made to influential lords in Kyushu and 
Shikoku,35 while others claim that the shogunate actually closed Yo­
doya because it wanted to halt futures transactions, which it consid­
ered gambling.36 Gambling or not, the government had additional rea­
sons to stop the trade - it believed that futures transactions led to 
artificially inflated physical rice prices, thereby leading to general 
price inflation.37 Prohibited or not, market participants continued to 
trade rice bills in futures transactions on the black market in front of 
Yodoya's house. Only spot trading (the trading of physical rice) con­
tinued legally at Dojima. 
C. Formal Establishment 
In 1716, Yoshimune became the eighth Tokugawa shogun, taking 
over a government with deteriorating finances. Y oshimune soon be­
gan a series of economic reforms, including a reduction of government 
spending and increases in land tax collection in 1721, and restrictions 
on feudal lord extravagance in 1724. One of Yoshimune's greatest 
concerns was falling rice prices. As Table 1 shows, prices had fallen 
considerably from the period immediately before Yoshimune took of­
fice. 
34. See SUGIE, supra note 6, at 177; James L. McOain, Space, Power, Wealth and Status 
in Seventeenth-Century Osaka, in OSAKA: THE MERCHANT'S CAPITAL OF EARLY MODERN 
JAPAN (James L. McClain & Osamu Wakita eds., 1999) at 44, 58. 
35. See Dmn, supra note 6, at 176-79; SUGIE, supra note 6, at 17. 
36. See DOHI, supra note 6, at 176-79; SUGIE, supra note 6, at 17. 
37. See MIYAMOTO, supra note 6, at 196-97; SUGIE, supra note 6, at 17. 
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TABLE 1: OSAKA RICE PRICES, 1713-1730 
Year Price (Silver monme per koku) 
1713 155.0 
1714 155.2 
1715 115.5 
1716 98.8 
1717 110.9 
1718 33.0 
1719 42.2 
1720 68.2 
1721 75.0 
1722 44.5 
1723 41.5 
1724 47.4 
1725 55.5 
1726 56.9 
1727 40.6 
1728 40.6 
1729 30.4 
1730 32.9 
Source: RYOzWO YAMAZAKI, KINSEi BUKKASHI KENKYO [A 
STUDYOFEARLYMODERNPRICEHISTORY] 92-93 (1983). 
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Low rice prices were a concern because members of the military 
received their salaries in rice, which they subsequently sold for cash to 
brokers,38 and because feudal lords repaid loans from local temples 
and shrines in rice.39 The government could easily inflate rice prices 
by controlling supply; the trick was to do so without causing wide­
spread inflation. Just as the previous government had outlawed fu­
tures transactions because of their perceived tendency to raise rice 
prices (and rice prices alone), Yoshimune - later dubbed the "rice 
shogun" - decided to employ them precisely for that reason in order 
to appease demands from the military and lords. In 1730, after re­
ceiving a petition from Tokyo merchants in Osaka (whom the gov­
ernment apparently felt it could trust more than the locals ),40 Yoshi­
mune officially authorized futures trading at the Dojima market. 
Y oshimune's 1730 edict stated in pertinent part: 
38. See, e.g., GEORGE SANSOM, A HISTORY OF JAPAN 1615-1867, at 164 (1963). 
39. See ROBERTS, supra note 18, at 16. 
40. See Dom, supra note 6, at 89; MIYAMOTO, supra note 6, at 196. 
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The rice trade of Osaka shall be conducted strictly in keeping with the 
customs observed until now, and such dealing in futures shall be permit­
ted for the merchants of the provinces, as well as Osaka middlemen. The 
fifty clearinghouses historically in existence shall conduct their business 
only under their private regulations and following their old customs in 
margin accounts, closing accounts, and so on; they shall extend their 
business as widely as possible, so that they may not cause inconvenience 
to the rice trade. The purpose of this authorization is to raise rice prices, 
and they should accordingly engage freely in their trade. The [old rice 
exchange] is abolished, but all the old customs are hereby valid. If any­
one attempts to deceive the public by calling a rule an old custom when 
in fact it is not, he shall be tried and severely punished. Except in ex­
treme circumstances, no suit relating to rice trade shall be heard. 41 
Y oshimune sent a second edict specifically to Edo, to which he at­
tached the first, and ordered simply that "no petition by a person of 
this town as to the rice market in Osaka shall be heard. "42 
D. Trading Practices 
Despite the legal unenforceability of futures contracts after Yo­
shim.une's edict, futures trading flourished at the formally established 
Dojima Exchange. In this Section, in order to describe the functional 
aspects of the Exchange, I analyze the Dojima Rice Exchange using 
the eight factors Roberta Romano has identified as features of futures 
exchanges.43 Although forward transactions appeared in Europe be­
fore Dojima's formal establishment,44 the following characteristics 
make Dojima the world's first organized futures exchange. 
41. BEISHO KYDKI (1616-1870) (emphasis added) reprinted as MATAJI MIYAMOTO, 3 
OSAKA KEIZAI SHIRYO SHOSEI (COMPILATION OF OSAKA ECONOMY DOCUMENTS] 76-77 
(1973); see also SHIMAMOTO, supra note 6, at 9-10; SUGIE, supra note 6, at 31. The decree 
applied specifically to futures contracts. Spot transactions at Dojima apparently had sepa· 
rate legal treatment. At some point in the An'ei era (1772-1780), the shogunate systemati­
cally gave spot transaction suits precedence over other suits, rendering quick judgments and 
accepting filings on days 'other than the two-a-month "suing days" specified for such matters. 
See SHIMAMOTO, supra note 6, at 20. 
42. BEISHO KYDKI, supra note 41, at 77. 
43. See Romano, supra note 8, at 10-20. Romano's list is similar to others, see, for ex­
ample, A.W.B. Simpson, The Origins of Futures Trading in the Liverpool Cotton Market, in 
EsSAYS FOR PATRICK ATIYAH 179, 180-81 (Peter Cane & Jane Stapleton eds., 1991). Un­
less otherwise indicated, I draw here principally from BEISHO KYDKI, supra note 41, and 
more modem accounts reported in MIYAMOTO, supra note 6, at 195-232; SHIMAMOTO, s11-
pra note 6, at 11-78; and SUGIE, supra note 6, at 31-83. 
44. See Meir Kohn, Risk Instruments in the Medieval and Early Modern Economy, in 
KOHN, supra note 13, at 10-12. The mid-sixteenth-century wagers on exchange rates at 
Antwerp that Kohn says "seem like modem futures contracts,'' id. at 12 & n.37, appear 
merely to be forwards, with no evidence of standardized contracts, clearinghouses, and the 
like. See RICHARD EHRENBERG, CAPITAL & FINANCE IN THE AGE OF THE RENAISSANCE: 
A STUDY OFTIIB FuGGERS AND THEIR CONNECTIONS 243-44 (H.M. Lucas trans., 1928). 
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1. Standardized Terms 
A forward contract is an agreement for the future delivery of an 
asset at a specified price at the end of a designated period of time. A 
futures exchange is a market in which participants trade standardized 
forward contracts. Futures contracts thus normally have standardized 
terms: a typical modem London Metal Exchange futures contract, for 
instance, specifies quotation unit, grade of material, quantity, price, 
delivery terms and procedures, and contract duration.45 At Dojima, 
the standard trading unit was 100 koku, each contract was equal to 100 
koku, and minimum price movements were measured at one koku. 
Delivery terms and procedures depended on the type of rice (rice was 
chosen by the market from the area that had the best harvest, for in­
stance, Kaga in the summer) and the warehouse in question. Because 
rice could be "branded" by harvest location, geography provided a 
convenient grading mechanism.46 
Contract duration was fixed by a trimester trading calendar, con­
sisting of a spring term (January 8-April 28), a summer term (May 7 
- October 9), and a winter term (October 17 -December 24).47 Con­
tracts had to be settled by the closing date of each term, and the end of 
each term included a three-day liquidation period. The market closed 
at the end of each term, and no trades for the following period could 
be made between terms. Although the system restricted the ability of 
traders to contract freely, it also provided an institutional constraint to 
prevent transactions with infinite time horizons that no market - in­
cluding most modem markets - could handle. 
Dojima's major innovation was the "book" transaction system 
( choaimai) for recording such trades. In the book transaction system, 
when traders reached an agreement, the names of the parties and the 
amount of rice traded were recorded in the market "book." The par­
ties were then required to complete the transaction through cash set­
tlement by the close of the trading term. Under this system, neither 
party required rice or cash when they made the bargain, making the 
practice well-suited for hedging. The book transaction system enabled 
organized futures trading at Dojima. 
45. The Exchange also has special contract rules pertaining to such matters as quality 
and quotation unit for each commodity. See ROBERT GIBSON-JARVIE, THE LONDON 
METAL EXCHANGE: A COMMODITY MARKET 29-33 (1976); RUDOLF WOLFF & Co LTD., 
WOLFF'S GUIDE TO THE LONDON METALS EXCHANGE 199-221 (5th ed. 1995). 
46. On the importance of grading, see Pirrong, supra note 1, at 234-35; Simpson, supra 
note 43, at 182. 
47. Dates may vary based on days of the week, and the winter and spring terms may 
technically have been one term split by the year-end holidays. See SHIMAMOTO, supra note 
6, at 38. Technically the months are lunar months and do not correspond exactly to the solar 
Gregorian calendar. The particular dates referred to herein are not important enough to 
merit revision of dates to the Gregorian system. 
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2. Transferability 
Futures contracts are readily transferable, which allows for closing 
out a position by taking the opposite side of the transaction. At 
Dojima, futures contracts were easily and commonly transferred, and 
parties could effectively close out positions by entering the opposite 
transaction (a buy versus a sell for the same amount of rice) on the 
book. Thus, as in modem futures markets, Dojima traders routinely 
closed out positions without purchasing the underlying physical quan­
tity of rice, thereby reducing transaction costs. 
3. Auction Trading 
Futures are usually traded in a pure auction model, unlike stock 
exchanges, which often use a specialist system. Dojima, like the fa­
mous hand signals and shouts of the Chicago market pits, also relied 
on an auction system. No specialist was necessary to make a trade. 
4. Price Limits 
Price limits are maximum daily price changes that a contract speci­
fies can occur. When a futures contract moves outside the price limit, 
no transactions can take place on that day. Such limits are used to 
prevent large fluctuations. Although Dojima futures contracts appear 
to have had no formal price limits, as Part II discusses, another institu­
tion - the firebox system - performed a similar function. 
5. Price Discovery 
According to theory, futures market prices communicate price in­
formation to underlying spot markets, and that information moves 
spot prices in the right direction.48 The Dojima market performed a 
similar price discovery function for physical rice transactions. The 
data presented in Part III provide empirical support, which is at least 
tentatively buttressed by two bits of anecdotal evidence. First, as a 
rule, trading in the Dojima futures market began two hours before 
trading in the Dojima spot market, suggesting that traders used futures 
information in their spot trading.49 Second, Dojima price information 
was so significant that it was transmitted immediately to Edo (Tokyo), 
48. See, e.g., FRANK J. FABOZZI ET AL., FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCIAL MARKETS AND 
INSTITUTIONS 507-08 (2d ed. 1998). 
49. See SAKUDO, supra note 12, at 369. 
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350 miles away and normally a six-day journey, by flag signals, smoke 
signals, and carrier pigeons.50 
6. Settlement 
Futures contracts are settled in cash, and sometimes by physical 
delivery. At Dojima, very few contracts were actually settled by 
physical delivery; like Chicago grain markets, Dojima was largely a 
place where "men who don't own something are selling that some­
thing to men who don't really want it."51 In most cases, traders settled 
all open positions through cash payment, a method made simple and 
convenient by the book transaction system. 
7. Clearinghouses 
In futures markets, a clearinghouse (normally an independent cor­
poration) guarantees a transaction by entering into both sides of a fu­
tures contract. When parties in futures markets reach an agreement, 
they actually contract with the clearinghouse as a third party. The 
clearinghouse becomes the seller to the buyer of the contract, and the 
buyer to the seller. In so doing, it guarantees performance and re­
duces risk from market transactions. It also reduces transaction costs 
by simplifying the process of unwinding positions by the settlement 
(delivery) date by allowing a party to contract with the clearinghouse 
and avoid searching for the original counterparty to the transaction. 
Remarkably, the seventeenth-century Dojima Exchange had such 
a clearinghouse institution. Initially, moneychangers, which numbered 
more than one thousand in 1700,52 changed rice into cash - a function 
made necessary largely because of the lack of a single unified cur­
rency. As transactions became more numerous and complex, mer­
chants relied more on these moneychangers - now functioning as 
brokers - to hold their deposits, and eventually to manage their af­
fairs. These brokers soon developed into full-fledged clearinghouses, 
serving as transaction intermediaries between contracting parties. 
While forward contract trading apparently occurred in Europe at 
about the same time as Dojima, the clearinghouse system sets Dojima 
apart as the first formalized futures exchange.53 
50. See MATAJI MIYAMOTO, NIBON SHOGYOSHI [JAPANESE COMMERCIAL HISTORY] 
120-21 (1949). But see MIYAMOTO, supra note 6, at 386-402 (noting the lack of united mar­
ket until the mid-eighteenth century and finding less correlation among isolated markets). 
51. Morton Rothstein, Frank Norris and Popular Perceptions of the Market, 56 AGRIC. 
HIST. 58 (1982), cited in WILLIAM CRONON, NATURE'S METROPOLIS: CHICAGO AND THE 
GREAT WEST 125 (1992). • 
52 See McClain, supra note 34, at 64-65. 
53. Most modem exchanges rely on one central clearinghouse institution, while Dojima 
had multiple clearinghouses. Although competition among multiple clearinghouses operat-
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8. Clearinghouse Requirements 
Clearinghouses must be compensated for their undertaking of risk, 
and compensation normally comes in the form of margin and daily set­
tlement requirements. Clearinghouses set margin requirements for 
members, who must maintain specified amounts in their margin ac­
counts to continue trading with the clearinghouse. Daily settlement 
requirements mitigate against the possibility of cumulative losses. 
Dojima clearinghouses had similar requirements, requiring margin 
payments to incur trading risk and requiring traders to enter their 
transactions into the house's trading book at the end of the trading 
day. The clearinghouses employed a ten-day mark-to-market mecha­
nism, adjusting margin accounts every ten days to reflect changes in 
the value of traders' positions. As in modem futures markets, cus­
tomers who experienced gains over the ten-day period could withdraw 
funds from margin accounts, while those who experienced losses had 
their margin account balance reduced. And as in modem futures 
markets, lending institutions arose to help traders finance margin re­
quirements.54 
The historical record suggests at least four reasons why Dojima 
participants were able to construct these formal market institutions at 
least 100 years before similar institutions developed in Europe. First, 
the shogunate's policy, intentional or otherwise, of allowing competi­
tion among three forms of currency fostered the development of 
money exchange brokers.ss These brokers formed the basis of the 
clearinghouse institutions and designed alternative payment systems 
(such as bills of credit) that led to the development of standardized fu­
tures contracts. Second, the feudal political system made financial 
demands on lords but did not limit their ability to exert power in the 
marketplace. Third, because rice was both an alternative currency and 
a seasonal, weather-sensitive commodity, it encouraged formal hedg­
ing by these lords. Finally, socioeconomic and even religious struc­
tures may have played a role. Merchants, divorced from the land, had 
both the ability and incentives to create a central marketplace in 
Osaka, and unlike some of their European counterparts, were unfet­
tered by a Christian or Muslim moral code that discouraged or pro­
hibited debt and usury.s6 
ing as brokers might seem efficient, the duplication of basic clearinghouse services by multi­
ple parties may have reduced potential gains. 
54. See MIYAMOTO, supra note 6, at 205. 
55. On the merits of currency competition, see F.A. HAYEK, DENATIONALISATION OF 
MONEY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONCURRENT CURRENCIES 
(1976). 
56. See OSAMU w AKITA, KINSEi OSAKA NO KEIZAI TO BUNKA (ECONOMICS AND 
CULTURE OF EARLY MODERN OSAKA] 44 (1994); JACK WEATHERFORD, THE HISTORY OF 
MONEY: FROM SANDSTONE TO CYBERSPACE 73-74 (1997) (noting that "if Christians lent 
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E. Regulation 
The Japanese government was largely uninvolved in the develop­
ment of these futures exchange institutions. Four brief exceptions 
tend to prove the rule. First, Y oshimune's 1730 edict established a li­
censing requirement, discussed further in Section II.B. Second, until a 
1765 edict provided a special exemption,57 the shogunate could (but 
seldom actually did) confiscate rice bills as a criminal penalty just as it 
had confiscated Yodoya's assets.58 That the assets of a merchant as 
large as Y odoya could be confiscated so easily is said to have caused 
other merchants to take great care in subsequent dealings.59 Third, the 
shogunate occasionally regulated the national rice market, mandating 
limits on the volume of rice that feudal lords could send to Osaka to 
prevent dumping, and setting city- and nation-wide price floors and 
ceilings on physical rice in times of crisis.60 Finally, as discussed fur­
ther in Part IV, in 1773, after nearly fifty years of denying civil en­
forceability, the government agreed to hear disputes and required rice 
sold at Dojima to bear the official seal of its newly appointed rice in­
spector.61 As two economic historians put it, "[t]he Osaka rice market 
money for interest, the Catholic church excommunicated them" and that "[t]he Koran spe­
cifically prohibited bills of exchange"). While usury prohibitions may have hampered the 
development of debt and financial intermediaries in Europe, they did encourage the early 
development of bills of exchange. See Kohn, supra note 13, at 9-10. 
57. See Dom, supra note 6, at 206. 
58. See supra text accompanying note 33. Confiscation of assets (kessho) was connected 
with punishments for all types of crimes. The severity of the confiscation depended on the 
severity of the crime. See RYOSUKE !SIDI, NIHON HOSEISlil GAISETSU [OUTLINE OF 
JAPANESE LEGAL HISTORY] 495, 498 n.13 (1948) [hereinafter RYOSUI<E ISmI, NIHON 
HOSEISlil GAJSETSU]; see also RYOSUKE ISmI, KEIBATSU NO REKISlil [THE HISTORY OF 
PUNISHMENT] 132 (1992) (explaining how Yoshimune established graduated fine system to 
complement asset confiscation in 1718). Confiscation normally applied only to the offender 
and not to an offender's group. See SlilNZO TAKAYANAGI, Eno JJDAJ NO TSUMI TO 
KEIBATSU SH0SETSU[CRIME ANDPuNISHMENT INTHETOKUGAWA PERIOD] 414(1988). 
59. See Yosmo SAKATA, CRONIN [MERCHANTS] 38 (1949). 
60. See Shinzaburo Oishi, Horeki, Tenmeiki no Bakusei [Shogunate Government in the 
Horeki-Tenmei Era (1751-1789)], in 11 lWANAMI KOZA NIHON REKISlil [IWANAMI SERIES 
ON JAPANESE HISTORY] 139 (1976); E.S. Crawcour & Kozo Yamamura, The Tokugawa 
Monetary System: 1787-1868, 18 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 489, 500 (1970); 
Shigeaki Yasuoka, Edo Chiiki no Osaka Torhiki Soshiki [The Trade Structure of Osaka in 
the Middle Tokugawa Era], 16 DOSIDSHA SHOGAKU 290 (1964). After 1830 and toward the 
end of the Tokugawa government, price control measures occurred with some regularity. 
See MASANORI HONJO, BAKUHANSEI SHAKAJ NO TENKAI BEIKOKU SHIJO [DEVELOPMENT 
OF FEUDAL GOVERNMENT AND RICE MARKETS] 361 (1994). 
61. See SmMAMOTO, supra note 6, at 19; Nobuhiko Nakai & James L. McClain, Com­
mercial Change and Urban Growth in Early Modem Japan, in 4 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF 
JAPAN 519, 587 (John Whitney Hall ed., 1991). After 1773, the shogunate still occasionally 
issued decrees regarding money claims, twice announcing that money clainls must be settled 
out of court, and granting amnesty to old futures-related claims. See Heiichiro Kaneda, 
Tokugawa Jidai no Tokubetsu Minji Soshiihii: Kanekuji no Kenkyii [Special Procedural Law 
of the Tokugawa Era: Research on Money Suits], 43 KOKKA GAKKAJ ZASSlil 362 (1928). 
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seems to have been largely beyond the control of the [govern­
ment] . . . .  It seems strange . . .  that the [government] did not attempt 
to influence the market more directly."62 
Despite the shogunate's relative laxity, Dojima participants never­
theless acted in the long shadow of latent governmental regulation. 
Licensing requirements determined the players of the game. The mo­
nopoly on futures contracts granted to Dojima likely increased the 
force of internal sanctions. The threat of license confiscation may 
have created additional incentives for proper behavior. The Dojima 
experience thus leaves open the possibility that the development of ef­
ficient rules in self-organized markets may require something less than 
complete governmental withdrawal. 
Regulatory developments at Dojima, especially before 1730, bear 
striking resemblance to those in early European and American mar­
kets. In the famous seventeenth-century Dutch tulip forwards market, 
trading persisted despite six government attempts to ban such trad­
ing. 63 In England, the passage in 1734 of Sir John Barnard's Act, "[a]n 
act to prevent the infamous practice of stock-jobbing," effectively 
banned the trading of options.64 Yet despite fines for selling stock that 
one does not own, option transactions apparently continued.65 In New 
York, a 1792 law, the "watered-down equivalent of Barnard's Act," 
did not explicitly prohibit options transactions, but made options con­
tracts void and thus unenforceable in court. In New York as in Eng­
land, "time bargains went on as before, but were enforced privately, 
without the assistance of the legal system."66 
Still, developments at Dojima differ from the English and 
American cases both in the degree of and the motives underlying gov­
ernmental restrictions. English legislation expressly prohibited futures 
trading, while the Japanese edict expressly legalized it, if only for one 
exchange. Part of the reason for the difference may lie in motive. 
Eighteenth-century English and American (and even in more recent 
times)67 authorities largely feared the harmful effects of "gambling" 
speculators on market prices. But, as I discuss in Part IV, the 
Japanese government, which had once itself viewed futures trading 
62. Crawcour & Yamamura, supra note 60, at 500. 
63. See MIKE DASH, TULIPOMANIA: THE STORY OF THE WORLD'S MOST COVETED 
FLOWER AND THE EXTRAORDINARY PASSIONS IT AROUSED 187-95 (2000); see also sources 
cited supra note 44. 
64. STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION 104-05 (1998). 
65. See id. at 106. 
66. Id. at 173-74. A similar phenomenon occurred in Chicago futures markets. See 
JEFFREY WILLIAMS, THE ECONOMIC FuNCTION OF FUTUREs MARKETS § 5.2, at 154-56 
(1986). 
67. See Stout, supra note 2, at 717. 
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with suspicion, apparently sought to promote, not to prohibit, private 
ordering. 
II. RULES OF ORDER 
As a full-fledged futures exchange in a relatively primitive legal 
and economic system, Dojima traders needed to devise governance 
mechanisms to ensure market order. This Part argues that while rela­
tional contracting played a role, the Exchange chose to rely more 
heavily on formal internal rules and institutions than on relational 
constraints. 
A. Governance 
Exchanges have historically been commercial mutual nonprofit in­
stitutions managed by boards of directors and standing committees 
pursuant to by-laws - possibly a consequence of member heteroge­
neity.68 Dojima employed a similar structure. Until the Meiji Restora­
tion of 1868, the Exchange remained a nonprofit association of trad­
ers. Although Exchange expenses were originally apportioned among 
members, the warehouses eventually took over payment.69 But while 
warehouses paid the fees, Exchange members elected Exchange offi­
cials. 
Formal governance of the Exchange was preceded by monopolis­
tic, geographically-based rice trader coalitions formed shortly after the 
passage of the 1730 law legalizing futures trading. From these coali­
tions came Exchange directors. Exchange members elected five "an­
nual directors" in a general election. They also elected five "monthly 
directors," but the coalition system ensured that the heads of the five 
largest groups of coalitions became monthly directors by default. An­
nual directors conducted the activities of the Exchange with some 
measure of independence, while monthly directors more directly rep­
resented member and coalition interests, thereby likely reducing 
agency costs. 
The system had at least one drawback. In order to maintain inde­
pendence, annual directors were required to cease trading upon taking 
office. But because annual director salaries could not compete with 
profits that a director might otherwise earn from trading, few potential 
directors wanted the job. Compensation aside, the job was not an easy 
one, as directors were required to attend the Exchange daily. Those 
68. See Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE LJ. 835, 841 
(1980); Craig Pirrong, A Positive Theory of Financial Exchange Organization with Normative 
Implications for Financial Market Regulation, at 37 (Working Paper, Oct. 16, 1997), at 
http://www.olin.wustl.edu/faculty/pirrong. 
69. See TASlilCHIRO TANAKA, NIHON TORIHIKUO RON (THEORY OF JAPANESE 
MARKETs] 29 (1910); see also Schaede, Forwards and Futures, supra note 7, at 496. 
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who did take the job often took sick days or purposely engaged in 
trading mid-term in order to disqualify themselves from further serv­
ice. In 1774, the system was modified to allow sitting annual directors 
to pick their successors and serve consecutive terms, thus enabling 
those who actually wanted the job and could develop professional 
managerial expertise over a period of time to take the position.70 
B. Market Order 
At least four ex ante institutional features of the Dojima market 
may have helped to prevent market abuses: licensing, cash settlement, 
the firebox pricing system, and coalitions. 
1. Licensing 
The government required a license of all Exchange players.71 The 
1730 shogunate edict limited the number of clearinghouses to the fifty 
then in existence, and the Exchange also required each trader to pur­
chase a trading license and affiliate with a clearinghouse. The shogu­
nate kept strict controls on the number of authorized traders. Little 
information remains regarding the criteria for allotment, and even 
contemporaneous sources differ on the details: one source finds 1,351 
licenses issued;72 another finds exactly 1,300.73 Traders purchased li­
censes for a fee from the government, and in most circumstances could 
only transfer them to their children or a worker who had been em­
ployed by the trader for more than ten years.74 While some of the 
traders worked as agents on behalf of feudal lord "clients," most func­
tioned independently.75 
The licensing system was the first regular mechanism for taxing the 
commercial sector in Japan and provided a significant source of sho-
70. See MIYAMOTO, supra note 6, at 203; SHOHEI SUZUKI, DOJIMA KOME SHUOSHI 
[HISTORY OFTHEDOJIMA RICE MARKET) 56-57 {1940). 
71. The Kyoho reforms of the 1710s and 1720s stressed the formation of protective asso­
ciations and licensing requirements across a wide variety of industries. See SHINZABURO 
OISHI, KYOHO KAIKAKU NO SHOGYO SEISAKU [COMMERCIAL POLICY OF THE KYOHO 
REFORMS] 201-03 {1998); Nakai & McClain, supra note 61, at 570-73. 
72 See BEISHO KYOKI, supra note 41, at 61 (stating that the shogunate issued 451 li­
censes in 1730, 538 in 1731, and 362 in 1734, for a total of 1,351, of which 451 were for spot 
transactions and 900 for futures). 
73. See HAMAKATA KIROKU [HAMAKATA RECORDS] {begun 1716), reprinted as 
EIJIRO HONJO Er AL., 2 KINSEi SHAKAI KEIZAI SOSHO [EARLY MODERN SOCIETY 
ECONOMICS SERIES! 24 {1926) (stating that the shogunate issued a total of only 1,300, in­
cluding 500 in 1731, 500 in 1732, and 300 in 1736). 
74. See Dom, supra note 6, at 94-95; SHIMAMOTO, supra note 6, at 58. 
75. In the Shotoku Period {1711-1715), Osaka is said to have been home to 17,727 mer­
chants, of which 483 were formal agents of feudal lords. See SANSOM, supra note 38, at 128. 
August 2000] First Futures Exchange 2593 
gunate income.76 But from the traders' perspective, licensing not only 
protected monopoly rights, it also limited the total number of dispu­
tants and eliminated or at least checked the number of novice traders. 
More importantly, the licensing system established a closed system in 
which forced bond-posting reduced the cost of scrutinizing trading 
partners and enabled punishment of participants even in the absence 
of strong inter-trader reputational bonds.77 To be sure, reputation 
played a role, as no repeat player would desire a reputation for un­
trustworthiness.78 But the licensing requirement, which relied not di­
rectly on reputation but on the ability to pay the fee (which itself may 
engender reputation), also helped ensure that internally mandated 
punishments could be instituted effectively by limiting participation by 
outsiders. 
2. Cash Settlement 
Dojima's general policy of cash settlement may have reduced op­
portunities for abuse. According to Craig Pirrong, most modem 
commodity futures contracts - over ninety-eight percent of physical 
commodity futures contracts by volume - are settled by delivery of 
the underlying asset.79 But Dojima's book transaction system lent it­
self to a cash settlement system.80 Many financial economists argue 
that cash-settled futures contracts are less susceptible to manipulation 
through market "cornering" or "squeezing." In contrast to a physical 
settlement system, potential abusers in a cash-settlement system can­
not as easily use their market share to control the actual physical 
commodity underlying the future.81 The cash settlement thus might 
have reduced the possibility of abuse. 
76. See 2 TOKUGAWA JIDAI SHOGYO SOSHO [TOKUGAWA ERA COMMERCIAL SERIES] 
9 (Matajiro Akabori ed. 1965) (1913). 
77. Compare to the diamond trading industry, which allows participation by nonmem­
bers. See Bernstein, supra note 1, at 152. 
78. See Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2's Incorporation 
Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 774-75 (1999) (noting that member­
ship requirements can also aid in reputational constraints). 
79. See Stephen Craig Pirrong, Manipulation of Cash-Settled Futures Contracts, 74 J. 
Bus. (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 1 n.2, on file with author and available at http:// 
www.olin.wustl.edu/faculty/pirrong). 
80. See supra text accompanying note 47. 
81. Among other things, cash settlement does not allow the buyer to demand an exces­
sive number of deliveries. See, e.g., Frank J. Jones, The Economics of Futures and Options 
Contracts Based on Cash Settlement, 2 J. FuTuRES MARKETS 63 (1982); Steven Manaster, 
Economic Consequences of Delivery Options for Financial Futures Contracts: Analysis and 
Review, 11 REV. FuTuRES MARKETS 142 (1992); cf. Praveen Kumar & Duane J. Seppi, Fu­
tures Manipulation with "Cash Settlement," 47 J. FIN. 1485 (1992) (noting that traders can 
manipulate cash-settled contracts through asymmetric information exploitation by "punch­
ing the settlement price"); Pirrong, supra note 79 (noting that traders can manipulate cash-
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3. The Firebox System 
The Exchange created an institution - the firebox system - that 
drastically limited a trader's ability to manipulate the market through 
comering.82 In their study of modem grain futures contracts, Craig 
Pirrong, David Haddock, and Roger Kormendi note four distinct 
methods of deterring manipulation: formal rules of an exchange or 
regulatory authority, ex post enforcement through punishment, con­
tract design, and informal enforcement through reputational loss.83 
The most straightforward ex ante method, they note, is the use of for­
mal rules regarding position limits.84 
Dojima participants utilized a modified position-limit mechanism.85 
The trading day for futures started precisely at 8 a.m., but a unique 
mechanism determined each day's closing time and closing price. In 
the Exchange hung a wooden box containing a wick. At the beginning 
of each day, Exchange officials set the wick on fire; when the fire went 
out, trading for that day ended. Much like modem exchanges fix set­
tlement prices,86 Dojima set the closing price for the day, and accord-
settled contracts through market power manipulation by squeezing the commodity used to 
determine the value of the contract). 
82. Craig Pirrong argues that control of manipulation by the state might be desirable in 
some circumstances. See Stephen Craig Pirrong, The Self-Regulation of Commodity Ex­
changes: The Case of Market Manipulation, 38 J.L. & ECON. 141 (1995). But see Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Monopoly, Manipulation, and the Regulation of Futures Markets, 59 J. BUS. 
Sl03 (1986); Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit "Manipulation" in 
Financial Markets?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 503 (1991). Even if Pirrong is correct, Dojima dif­
fers from the markets that Pirrong examines. The Dojima rules discussed herein (but per­
haps not the practice) appear to differ from those of the Chicago Board of Trade and other 
exchanges that Pirrong finds "took few, if any, actions to deter manipulation." Pirrong, su­
pra, at 195. Pirrong also finds that effective self-regulation came about only after the advent 
of federal commodity laws. See Pirrong, supra, at 192-95. Dojima rules changed little after 
legal intervention. See infra text accompanying note 130. 
Determining why Dojima rules differ from other markets - why traders adopted the 
firebox system - is more difficult. Perhaps the answer lies in homogeneity. See Pirrong, 
supra, at 158. But the degree of homogeneity of financial interests that existed among mer­
chants, which comprised a very broad status group, is unclear at best, and the size of the ex­
change points toward heterogeneity. See Pirrong, supra, at 162 (noting that enforcement is 
lower when exchange membership is large). Perhaps the answer lies in the inability to cost­
shift. Pirrong argues that consumers of exchange services may bear the bulk of costs of ma­
nipulation, not exchange members. See Pirrong, supra, at 164. But while Dojima may have 
had fewer external consumers than some modem markets, they did exist. See supra text ac­
companying note 75. Perhaps a better answer is that the firebox system was adopted simply 
to determine objectively a closing time, and its antimanipulation effects were an inadvertent 
bonus. 
83. See S. CRAIG PIRRONG ET AL., GRAIN FuruREs CONTRACTS: AN ECONOMIC 
APPRAISAL 82-102 (1993). 
84. See id. at 82. 
85. The following description relies on SHIMAMOTO, supra note 6, at 45-46, 107; SUGIE, 
supra note 6, at 46; and SUZUKI, supra note 70, at 100-01. 
86. See, e.g., FABOZZI ET AL., supra note 48, at 503. 
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ingly the opening price for the following day, at a price representative 
of trading when the fire went out. Sometimes the closing price was the 
last trading price, but sometimes the last trades were ignored and offi­
cials set the closing price at a general average based on preceding 
trades. 
If the Exchange could not determine a closing price, or if the wick 
did not burn up completely, all trades for that day were declared void. 
That day's opening price became the closing price, and consequently 
the opening price for the next day. It was as if that trading day never 
occurred. By way of example, in May 1762, due to a drought in the 
southern island of Kyushu, futures prices rose from 55.8 monme of sil­
ver on May 7 to 72 monme on May 29. The price of 72 was seen as in­
credibly high, and traders stopped trading midday. Unable to find an 
official closing price, all transactions for that day were voided, and the 
next day's opening price was set at the previous day's closing price of 
68 monme.1>1 
Although the firebox system had its quirks (for instance, the Ex­
change apparently would void a trading day even if rain extinguished 
the fire ),88 it played an important role in market management. Occa­
sionally it created a ruckus, as on-a-roll traders had their assistants fan 
the wick, and losers of the day tried to extinguish the flame.89 But 
generally the firebox system appears to have been an effective method 
of curbing abuses such as cornering or dumping. Made aware of a po­
tential manipulation scheme, traders simply stopped trading. At the 
end of the day, no closing price could be found, all transactions would 
be voided, and the potential abuser would not profit. The system thus 
encouraged mutual monitoring of trading activity. 
It is possible that the firebox system may have also been used to 
punish nonmanipulating traders. But no record of such behavior ex­
ists, a fact possibly attributable to collective action problems in organ­
izing a punitive strike. At the least, the mechanism does not suffer 
from the unappealing qualities that arbitrary fixed position limits set 
by outside enforcers sometimes do. 
4. Coalitions 
Finally, in addition to the above rules, the geographical coalitions 
that arose after 173090 discouraged abuses through reputational 
87. See SHIMAMOTO, supra note 6, at 46. 
88. See id. at 43. 
89. Exchange directors were once forced to issue an order to control related violence. 
See BEISHO KYOKJ, supra note 41, at 3fJ7. 
90. See supra text accompanying note 69. 
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bonds.91 Merchants within a particular coalition would be unlikely to 
cheat one another for fear of being barred from the coalition, which 
would result in loss of livelihood. Likewise, merchants from other 
coalitions would think twice about cheating a member of another coa­
lition for fear of mass reprisal. Coalitions thus improved upon simple 
intertrader reputation mechanisms by reducing the premium that mer­
chants must pay to keep their trading partners honest. 
C. Why Rules? 
In matters of both governance and abuse prevention, Dojima par­
ticipants appear to have relied less heavily on informal reputational 
monitoring and enforcement by market participants than on formal 
monitoring and enforcement by the organization. Inter-trader reputa­
tion certainly mattered, and the geographic coalitions surely facilitated 
exploitation of intertrader reputational bonds. But the Exchange ap­
pears to have addressed major problems of market organization and 
efficiency primarily through formal constraints: rules, licenses, clear­
inghouse institutions, and so on. Moreover, many of the longstanding 
trading and governance rules and practices existed at least fifty years 
before the rise of coalitions, suggesting that rules reliant on organiza­
tional, rather than individual, monitoring of reputation may have been 
more important at Dojima than in other (largely) self-regulating 
groups. At least three reasons suggest why Dojima relied on rules to 
the extent that it did. 
First, in some cases, such as the trader licensing system, Dojima 
participants had no choice between rules and inter-trader reputation, 
as the state mandated the decision. Participants might have preferred 
an internally devised membership constraint that might have led to 
greater reliance on reputational bonds, but they were not given the 
option. Indeed, they actually formulated some of their own internal 
licensing requirements that were ultimately co-opted by the state. 
Second, as Lisa Bernstein notes in her analysis of the cotton indus­
try, reputation may be more important in industries in which grading 
of goods is difficult.92 Because rice could easily be graded by geo­
graphic origin,93 it may have been more easily subject to relatively 
rigid internal rules. Were rice as difficult to grade as diamonds, per­
haps intertrader reputational constraints would have been more im­
portant. 
91. See Avner Grief, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: 
The Maghribi Traders' Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525 (1993); Paul R. Milgrom et al., 
The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the 
Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1 (1990). 
92 See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Value Creation 
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2001). 
93. See supra text accompanying note 46. 
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Finally, unlike many of the other self-regulated commercial mar­
kets analyzed in the law and economics literature, participants at 
Dojima did not choose to opt out of the legal system. Given the 
choice, they might have preferred shogunate-imposed rules and sup­
port. But while the shogunate's 1730 edict explicitly adopted many 
existing Dojima institutions, it forced participants themselves to or­
ganize many aspects of the Exchange, including governance and dis­
pute resolution mechanisms.94 
III. MARKET PERFORMANCE 
How effective were Dojima institutions in reducing transaction 
costs and establishing an ordered market? In some studies of self­
regulating commercial markets, a lack of data forces analysts into rela­
tively ad hoc conclusions: private ordering in such markets is efficient 
because long-lasting; were it inefficient, these markets would not exist. 
The argument applies here as well - the Exchange is unlikely to have 
been terribly inefficient, given its long history and high trading volume 
for such an extended period of time. 
But fortunately, Dojima provides relevant data, which offer more 
precise alternatives than mere longevity, but not necessarily less as­
sailable conclusions, for judging efficiency. For at least three genera­
tions, the House of Tamao, located in Shiga Prefecture near Kyoto, 
kept price records for various early modem Japanese rice markets in 
the form of a thirteen-volume Market Price Diary (Mansoba Nikki). 
From these brush-stroke manuscripts, historian Mieko Tsuruoka com­
piled a list of spot prices for various rice markets and futures prices for 
Dojima for the continuous period beginning in 1755 and ending in 
1827; she then published it as an attachment to her 1972 article in a 
publication as obscure as its title suggests: Department of Historical 
94. The force-out nature of the Exchange and the rules and organization that resulted 
may point to a difference among self-organized markets. Organizations that have the ability 
to rely on relational bonds among market participants as more precisely tailored substitutes 
for legal rules may be more likely than other organizations to opt out of the legal system. 
But in force-out cases, organizations might not opt out of the legal system because the bind­
ing propensity of relations is less significant. Relations might be less binding because the 
group is less homogenous, because costs are significant, or because the transactions involved 
are complex and rely more on an informed market than a relationally sound one. In these 
instances, groups may be more likely to turn to rules, or organizational monitoring, to gov­
ern their affairs. The opt-out/force-out dichotomy may help explain why "it is primarily the 
fear of damage to reputation that maintains discipline in the diamond trade, not the bourse's 
board of arbitrators" that governs diamond traders who "opt out" of the legal system, 
Bernstein, supra note 1, at 152, just as close-knit groups like cattle ranchers and farmers in 
Shasta County animal trespass rely on social norms, see Ellickson, supra note 1, while early 
participants at the New York Stock Exchange relied on a "miniature legal system" that 
"filled the void created by the unenforceability of time bargains in New York courts," 
Banner, supra note 1, at 132. Although Dojima traders were all members of the merchant 
status group, that designation alone may have been insufficient to establish the requisite 
bonds needed for inter-trader monitoring and a preemptive opt-out. 
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Documents Research Bulletin (Shiryi5kan Kenkyii Kiyo).95 Japanese 
economists who have used portions of the Tsuruoka dataset have re­
ported it to be reliable.96 But because the dataset omits brief periods, I 
examined the manuscripts directly to confirm the dataset's accuracy. 
My examination led to changes in two price entries (one omission and 
one apparent transposition of figures) and the addition of two missing 
prices. 
The Tsuruoka dataset lists prices at approximately two-week inter­
vals but does not contain specific entries for one important category: 
opening and closing prices for each term in the trimester system. The 
only available source for such data canvasses a comparatively shorter 
period of time. In September 1762, the House of Kashiwahara in 
Osaka published "Ancient and Modern Rice Price Chart" (Kokon 
Hachimoku Si5bachi5)91 in which it listed annual opening and closing 
prices, as well as occasional annual trading volume data from 1724 to 
1762. Although these data improve over the course of the period, 
even the data from better years are too sparse to be statistically useful. 
But the Appendix (Di5tsuiki5) to that volume, published in 1781 by the 
House of Fuji,98 contains similar data from more regular intervals 
(monthly rice bill volume data and opening and closing prices for each 
term) from 1763 to 1780. In his 1970 collection of Dojima source ma­
terials, historian Tokuichi Shimamoto reprinted these House of Fuji 
opening and closing prices.99 Once again, I confirmed the accuracy of 
the dataset by examining a copy of the original manuscript housed in 
the Mitsui Archives and found only minor discrepancies. I added 
these data to the Tsuruoka dataset. 
95. Mieko Tsuruoka, Otsu Kokurui Sonata Sobahyo [Chart of Grain and Other Com­
modity Prices in Otsu], attached to Kinsei Beikoku torhiki Shijo toshite no Otsu [Otsu as a 
Tokugawa Rice Market], 5 SHIRYOKAN KENKYO KIYO 19, 114-207 (1972). The Bulletin was 
at the time administered by the Ministry of Education but now by the National Institute of 
Japanese Literature. 
96. See MIYAMOTO, supra note 6, at 365; Ito, supra note 6, at 343; Wakita, supra note 6, 
at 241. To my knowledge, these three works, all in Japanese, are the only formal economic 
analyses of Dojima that exist. Each uses the Tsuruoka dataset. Miyamoto uses the entire 
dataset, but his examination focuses on the Exchange's efficiency relative to each shogun's 
reign and to currency valuation, and does not acknowledge the bias presented by the closed­
trimester system, providing results that Ito bluntly calls "meaningless." Ito, supra note 6, at 
345. Ito uses Tsuruoka data, but only for the period from 1763 to 1780, and only to fill in 
gaps between closing dates. Wakita uses a fuller set, from 1760 to 1811, but his focus is sea­
sonal variation. 
97. Hachimoku is an early modem word for rice. See Kahei no Sanpomichi [Currency 
Walking Tour], INSTITUIE FOR MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES, BANK OF JAPAN, ch. 
16, available at http://imes.boj.or.jp/cm/htmls/feature_l6.htm. Some sources, both English 
and Japanese, occasionally mistransliterate the Japanese characters as "yagi," the surname 
that uses the same characters. 
98. See generally Tsuruoka, supra note 95, at 113. 
99. See Hachimoku Sobachii TsuikO [Rice Price Appendix]; TOKUICHI SHIMAMOTO, 
DOJIMA KOME KAIJO BUNKENSHO (COLLECTED DOJIMA RICE EXCHANGE SOURCE 
MATERIALS] 1-37 (1970). 
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To these data I added the occasional prices listed in the Rice Trade 
Chronicle (Beisho Kyiiki), recorded from 1616 to 1870. As in all em­
pirical studies, more data would be preferable, but by adding these 
prices to the combination of the Tsuruoka (House of Tamao) and 
Shimamoto (House of Fuji) datasets, I have compiled the most com­
plete database of Dojima prices ever assembled. Except where other­
wise noted, the remainder of this Part, including all figures, is based on 
this database. 
In this Part, I use the database to examine two simple efficiency­
related questions. First, how closely do spot and futures prices corre­
late and what factors affect that correlation? Second, what happens to 
that correlation at the end of a trading term?100 Unfortunately, insuffi­
cient data exist to determine the market's informational efficiency -
the degree to and speed with which its prices reflect publicly available 
information - through an event study or similar methodology. The 
scarcity of the available data may also yield differing interpretations. 
But with those caveats, the following tests of the data can still provide 
insight into whether Dojima functioned in accordance with modem 
efficient market theory. 
A. Correlation of Spot and Forwards (Futures) Prices 
Traders use futures to reduce risk by hedging - counterbalancing 
activities in the market for physical goods to protect themselves 
against price movements. If spot prices (the price of current physical 
goods) and futures prices (the price of forward-contract goods) di­
verge frequently, such risk-reduction measures may be uncertain and 
difficult, and traders can only use futures prices for speculative excess. 
If the Dojima Rice Exchange fulfilled its risk reduction function well 
and was not merely a tool for speculation, spot prices and futures 
prices should be highly correlated, with relatively smooth movements 
during the trading term. 
Contemporaneous accounts indicate that spot and futures prices 
did indeed correlate. Consider a 1798 popular instruction manual -
the Tokugawa equivalent of How to Make a Million in the Market. 
The book boasted a win rate of seventy to eighty percent and stated in 
typically roundabout prose, "The rise and fall of the spot and book 
prices appear different, but are the same; they appear the same, but 
are different in their inner workings alone; they are the same differ­
ence."101 
100. As noted infra notes 108 and 112, Japanese economists have attempted to address 
both questions, using smaller data sets and different tests, but obtaining similar results. 
101. Master Kenikukan, Hachimoku Ryiinokan [Dragon Book of Rice] {1798), in TARO 
ADACHI, TOKUGAWA JIDAI KEIZAI H!ROKU ZENSHO [COMPILATION OF SECRET 
ECONOMIC RECORDS OFTIIB TOKUGAWA ERA) 371, 385 {1941). 
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The data tend to confirm the accounts. Figure 1 shows the correla­
tion between spot and futures prices during the period 1755-1827. As 
theory predicts, price movements are smooth, and spot and forward 
prices are correlated, with no major anomalies. The movements cor­
respond favorably to those of modem futures markets.102 
Rfµ'e 1: Price Carelaioo, 1755-1827 
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The Exchange can also be examined by analyzing the spread be­
tween spot and futures prices. Intuitively, one might expect futures 
prices to exceed spot prices: because of carrying costs such as interest, 
storage costs, and insurance, a buyer can purchase today one sack of 
rice for less money than he can purchase the right to purchase that rice 
in the future. When futures prices exceed spot prices, the situation is 
termed "contango" or "normal carry," or, in eighteenth-century 
Japanese, "upper margin" (uwazaya). But short-term price increases, 
low carrying costs, and premiums paid by producers for the ability to 
hedge their own anticipated supplies, can often result in higher spot 
prices than futures prices, a situation known as "backwardation" or 
"inverse carrying charge,m03 or, in eighteenth-century Japanese, 
102 See, e.g., WALTER C. LABYS & C.WJ. GRANGER, SPECULATION, HEDGING AND 
COMMODITY PRICE FORECASTS 25-32 (1970); MIYAMOTO, supra note 6, at 365-85. The 
trimester trading system, see supra text accompanying note 47, makes detailed empirical 
comparisons of this measure with other futures markets difficult, if not impossible. 
103. See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Business Cycles and the Behavior of 
Metals Prices, 53 J. FIN. 1075 (1988); Holbrook Working, Theory of the Inverse Carrying 
Charge in Futures Markets, 30 J. FUTuRE ECON. 9 (1949). On the efficiency of Dojima as a 
hedge institution, see Matao Miyamoto, Edo Jidai no Kome Shijo: Sono Koza to Kina [The 
Stmcture and Function of Tokugawa Era Rice Markets], GENDAI KEIZAI, 48, 56-62 (Spring 
1982). 
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"lower margin" (shitazaya). Relative to the spot market, a futures 
market is either in contango or backwardation. Figure 2 shows 
graphically the differences in the spot and futures prices for the same 
period depicted in Figure 1. 
Figure 2: Spot/Futures Price Deviation: Contango and Backwardation 
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Date 
Movements above zero indicate periods in which the futures price 
exceeded the spot price, in other words, when the market is in con­
tango. Movements below zero indicate backwardation. Some degree 
of backwardation is not surprising; although transportation costs were 
high, storage costs were relatively low.104 The market experienced pe­
riods of both backwardation and contango, with the only major period 
of extreme backwarda'tion occurring in 1787 during the Great Tenmei 
Famine.105 The Famine, which began in 1783 and continued through 
1787 as a result of flooding and volcanic eruption, drove short-term 
spot prices much higher than futures prices and explains both the in­
creased average backwardation and the large dip in that period.106 
The lack of either lengthy or extreme periods of backwardation or 
contango tentatively suggests that the market was suitable for hedging. 
But because the long-term data are noisy and conclusions are difficult, 
I have attempted to find clearer patterns. Recall that Dojima was a 
104. See MIYAMOTO, supra note 6, at 190-91. 
105. That the famine occurred at all may indicate the limited reach of the shogunate 
government. See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999). 
106. Other large movements are more difficult to explain. The early 1762 contango oc­
curred at about the same tinle that the shogunate offered financial assistance to at least one 
rice brokerage suffering from low physical rice prices, perhaps due to excess supply. See 
DOHI, supra note 6, at 206. Spot prices rose in mid-1762 due to the Kyushu drought. See 
supra text accompanying note f!:/. 
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seasonal market with three distinct trading terms.107 Each year was di­
vided into a spring term (January 8 - April 28), a summer term (May 7 
- October 9), and a winter term (October 17 - December 24), and 
traders were required to settle all contracts by the end of each term 
when the market closed. To test whether market conditions may dif­
fer in each term, I recalculated the data presented in Figure 2 by 
month. Figure 3 represents the combined annual monthly averages of 
those calculations. 
Cl! 
'Cl 
Figure 3: Seasonal Price Changes 
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The seasonal data reveal two interesting trends. First, the terms 
are indeed distinct in the data, indicating that traders may have had 
different concerns depending on the season. Second, as the figure 
shows, futures prices were generally higher than spot prices in the 
spring and fall markets, while the opposite was generally true in the 
summer market. This trend may be an indication that (1) transporta­
tion costs peaked in the fall, when rice arrived in Osaka after the har­
vest, which could lead to higher futures prices, and (2) the summer 
season, as an off-farming season that preceded the fall harvest, reflects 
low transportation costs, more potential for short-term squeezes of 
dwindling rice, and the payment of a premium by traders and suppliers 
hedging against the uncertain incoming fall harvest.108 
107. See supra text accompanying note 47. 
108. See Wakita, supra note 6, at 243 (showing seasonal efficiency with a smaller dataset 
by regressing the log of the spread against a seasonal dummy). 
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B. End of Trading Term 
All things being equal, spot and futures prices should converge as 
the delivery date approaches and carrying costs decrease to near zero. 
In most markets, which have continuous seasons and multitudinous 
contracts with differing delivery dates, this relationship is difficult, if 
not impossible, to analyze empirically.109 But the trimester system at 
Dojima makes exposition of the theory possible like virtually no other 
market. In short, no matter how significantly spot and futures prices 
deviate from one another during the trading period, they should con­
verge at the end of a term because futures contracts cannot extend be­
yond that point. Intuitively, the value of a forward contract for rice 
today should equal the value of rice bought on the market today.U0 
Again, contemporaneous evidence of this phenomenon at Dojima 
exists. As economic philosopher Banto Yamagata observed in 1802: 
The blood of this world is the book transaction system, and the spot price 
and the book price are like day and night, working together and not 
against each other. Though the prices diverge, at the end of April, 
October, and December, the spot and book price are the same; they be­
come the same blood.111 
The data tend to confirm Yamagata's observation.112 Market 
opening and closing date price data are available for the period 1763-
1780. Because a single chart covering that period would provide insuf­
ficient detail, I instead present data graphically for three years: one in 
the beginning (1764), one in the middle (1773), and one at the end 
(1780) of that period. The remaining years exhibit the same trend as 
these years, presented in Figures 4, 5, and 6. 
109. See PIRRONG ET AL., supra note 83, at 15-16. 
110. The data in Section III.A are biased toward higher correlation because of this phe­
nomenon, but the monthly correlations show the same general trend even in the absence of 
term-ending months. 
111. Banta Yamagata, Yume no Shiro [The Stuff of Dreams] (1802), in TOMINAGA 
NAKAMOTO, y AMAGATA BANTO 141, 398 (Norihisa Mizuta et al. eds., 1973). 
112. Ito conducts a sinillar test for different periods using a smaller dataset. See Ito, su­
pra note 6, at 343. 
2604 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 98:2574 
Figure 4: Price Movements, 1764 
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Figure 5: Price Movements, 1773 
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Figure 6: Price Movements, 1780 
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In each period, as the figures show, if one did not know the exact 
closing date, finding the poi.Ilt at which spot'prices and forward prices 
converge would serve as a good indicator. In each period, the market 
performed as theory predicts - although prices varied during the 
course of the trading period, the lack of carrying costs ensured that 
they converge at the end of each period. 
Aggregate data tend to confirm the results of the individual period 
data. For the period 1763-1780, I calculate the average difference in 
closing prices to be .04 monme, and the average difference in non­
closing prices to be .11 monme. In percentage terms, on average, 
closing forward prices were a miniscule .07% higher than closing spot 
prices, while non-closing forward prices were a full .35% higher. In 
short, the data suggest that the market performed just as theory would 
predict. 
· 
IV. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
The data presented in Part III indicate that the Exchange per­
formed the tasks of risk reduction and price discovery well and that its 
prices accord with economic theories of market efficiency. In this 
Part, I examine the murkier relationship between state regulation and 
Exchange efficiency. 
A. The 1730 System 
The 1730 shogunate decision to disallow suits over futures con­
tracts113 was part of a broader legal and institutional plan. Although 
crossover occurred, the shogunate generally distinguished between 
two types of suits: criminal proceedings (ginmisuji) and civil pro­
ceedings (deirisuji).114 Civil proceedings were further divided into 
three types: suits involving close relations (nakamagoto ); "money 
suits" (kanekuji), which were suits "based on unsecured money claims 
upon which interest was charged;"�15 and "main suits" (honkuji), which 
were claims based on general property rights and involved security. 
The ability to sue in shogunate courts depended on the type of 
proceeding, which in turn was determined by the relationship of the 
parties. The shogunate prohibited suits involving close relations, spe­
cifically excluding suits involving rotating credit associations, contracts 
among several persons to start certain businesses, and controversies 
arising from gate receipts at entertainment events such as plays and 
sumo matches. In each case, the shogunate, because of the close rela­
tionship among parties to such transactions (including the latter rela-
113. See supra text accompanying note 41. 
114. See RYOSUKE ISHII, NIHON HOSEISHI GAISETSU, supra note 58, at 471. 
115. Henderson, supra note 23, at 108. 
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tionship between theater proprietors and money-backing producers), 
withheld jurisdiction and forced parties to such private transactions to 
solve their own disputes.116 
The shogunate also distinguished between money suits and main 
suits, the former being strictly limited by minimum amounts in contro­
versy requirements and the constraint that damages be paid in install­
ments rather than as a lump sum.117 Courts more liberally heard main 
suits, namely those most likely to occur between strangers. 
Potential explanations for these distinctions might be the elimina­
tion of court congestion, paucity of judicial resources, or the shogu­
nate's lack of real regulatory power within the federalist system. 
These factors likely were real concerns. But the shogunate's policy of 
tying enforceability to relation-based criteria, along with its broad 
policy of coalition establishment in other contexts, supports the claim 
of several Japanese legal and economic scholars who suggest an addi­
tional reason why the shogunate limited suits: to encourage the pri­
vate resolution of problems that might arise from merchant con­
tracts.118 By requiring private dispute resolution, the shogunate may 
have hoped to provide incentives for parties to develop efficient rules 
and norms to avoid disputes, thus spurring economic growth through 
market development without expending government resources.119 
As with other relationship-based transactions, the state prohibited 
suits at Dojima altogether. Forced out of the legal system, the Ex­
change had to develop dispute resolution institutions on its own. Un­
fortunately, little has been recorded about the specifics of Dojima dis­
pute resolution. Exchange directors appointed a conciliation 
committee, which apparently had broad powers to resolve disputes, 
and promulgated rules largely on an individual basis with nominal re­
gard to internal precedent.120 
116. See RYOSUKE ISHII, KINSEi TORIHIKIHOsm [HISTORY OF EARLY MODERN 
COMMERCIAL LAW] 52-58 (1982). On ten occasions in the Tokugawa period (about every 
twenty years, and four times after the Exchange's founding, in 1746, 1789, 1797, and 1843), 
the shogunate issued orders (aitaisumashirez) refusing to hear all credit-related suits. See id. 
at 15-49. 
117. See RYOSUKE ISHII, NIHON HOSEISIIl GAISETSU, supra note 58, at 527, 529-30. 
118. See TETSun OKAZAKI, Eno NO SHJJO KEIZAI: REKISIIl SEIDO BUNSEKI KARA 
MITA KABUNAKAMA [MARKET ECONOMICS OF Eno: COALITIONS THROUGH THE LENS 
OF HISTORICAL SYSTEM ANALYSIS] 76 {1999); see also MATAn MIYAMOTO, 
KABUNAKAMA NO KENKYO [STUDY OF COMPANION SHARES] 21-33 {1938); OISHI, supra 
note 71. 
119. See ISHII, supra note 116, at 52-58; OKAZAKI, supra note 118, at 76. 
120. See BEISHO KYDKI, supra note 41, at 105 {discussing provisions for dealing with 
rule violators); ISHII, supra note 116, at 52-58; OKAZAKI, supra note 118, at 76; see also 
DIAMOND & KOLLAR, supra note 8, at 7-8. 
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B. The 1773 System 
In February 1773, the commissioner of Osaka, a shogunate official 
with broad administrative and judicial powers,121 issued a decree in 
which he reversed Yoshimune's 1730 edict122 by agreeing to hear fu­
tures-related suits on designated "suing days."123 If a plaintiff proved 
his case, the shogunate would pay damages to the plaintiff and collect 
the judgment from the defendant.124 Dojima traders could thus choose 
between state and internal dispute resolution mechanisms. 
There are at least four plausible theories as to why the decree was 
issued. First, the government may have thought it was responding to a 
need for dispute settlement services that the Exchange was not pro­
viding adequately. Second, one scholar surmises that the shogunate 
sought to increase trading volume and control of the Exchange in gen­
eral.125 Third, broader political motives may have been responsible for 
the decree. The policies of shogun Tanuma (1719-1788) were re­
markably different from those of the "rice shogun" Y oshimune, whose 
1730 edict legalized Dojima trading. Tanuma intervened in a variety 
of markets, including Dojima, to gain greater control for the govern­
ment over macroeconomic conditions.126 Finally, the shogunate may 
have desired to control the Exchange in order to limit the power of 
nouveaux riche Dojima merchants who were owed great debts by 
status-superior samurai.127 
The 1773 edict was short-lived. The shogunate discontinued the 
system in November 1784, and the government once again removed 
121. Unlike the Edo commissioner, which apparently was largely a civil administration 
organ, the Osaka commissioner was charged with the administration of justice, including the 
powers to legislate and hear suits. See GENTARO HARUHARA, OSAKA NO 
MACHIBUGYOSHO TO SAIBAN [LAWSUITS AND THE OSAKA TOWN COMMISSION] 11 (1962). 
The Osaka commissioner had crintinal investigative powers as well, but often relied on pri­
vate enforcement. See YOSHII Fum, OSAKA MACHIBUGYO TO KEIBATSU [CRIMINAL 
PUNISHMENT AND THE OSAKA TOWN COMMISSIONER] 73, 83 (1990). 
122 See supra text accompanying note 41. 
123. See BEISHO KYDK:r, supra note 41, at 177 (1971); 0FUREGAKI TENMEI SHOSEI 
[COMPILATION OF TENMEI PERIOD ORDINANCES (1781-1789)] 835 (Shinzo Takayanagi & 
Ryosuke Ishii eds., 1936); SAKUDO, supra note 12, at 370. 
124. See SHIMAMOTO, supra note 6, at 19. If a plaintiff had been forced to enforce the 
judgment against the defendant, the best way to enforce a debt claint was said to be the hir­
ing of "[g]angs of ruffians to beat up non-paying debtors." S1EENSTRUP, supra note 20, at 
146; see also Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An 
Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 41 (2000). 
125. See SAKUDO, supra note 12, at 370. 
126. See generally CHARLES DAVID SHELDON, THE RISE OF THE MERCHANT CLASS IN 
TOKUGAWA JAPAN 1600-1868, at 114-21 (1958). 
127. See NAOTARO SEKIYAMA, NIHON KAHEI KIN'YDSHI KENKYD [A STUDY OF 
JAPANESE CURRENCY FINANCIAL HISTORY] (1943). 
2608 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 98:2574 
itself from Dojima dispute resolution.128 Beginning in 1785, traders re­
turned to the pre-1773 status quo of settling all their own disputes. 
It is difficult accurately to determine how many post-1773 suits 
from Dojima actually reached shogunate courts. Table 2 offers the 
best available solution by detailing the total number of suits of all 
types heard by the Osaka commissioner: 
TABLE 2: LAWSUITS FILED WITH THE OSAKA COMMISSIONER 
Year Total Suits 
1735 13,625 
1736 12,817 
1737 10,917 
* * * 
1782 20,201 
1783 27,868 
1784 24,159 
1785 16,285 
1786 13,278 
SOURCE: GENTARO HARUHARA, OSAKA NO MACHIBUGYOSHO 
TO SAIBAN [LAWSUITS AND THE OSAKA TOWN COMMISSION] 12-
13 (1962). 
Both the accuracy of the data and the ability of these gross data 
properly to reflect futures-specific suits naturally warrant a fair degree 
of skepticism. But in general, the annual number of suits in the period 
after the 1773 decree (allowing for a huge 45-year data gap) was not 
dramatically higher than the number of suits in the period 1735-1737, 
and some increase is to be expected in a period of growing commer­
cialism and population expansion.129 Likewise, there is no surviving 
evidence of any significant change in the use of the Exchange's con­
ciliation mechanism. 
128. See OFUREGAKI TENMEI SHOSEI [COMPILATION OF TENMEI PERIOD 
ORDINANCES (1781-1789)], supra note 123, at 837-38. After September 1782, rice bills were 
required to carry the seal of the commissioner's designated rice inspector, who settled dis­
putes. See id.; see also SAKUDO, supra note 12, at 370; SHIMAMOTO, supra note 6, at 20. 
129. The impact of population on litigation rates in this case is ambiguous at best. The 
most precise estimates measure the population of Osaka at 268,760 in 1635, 389,866 in 1736, 
peaking at 419,863 in 1765, and gradually declining to 380,416 in 1785. See Osamu Wakita, 
Kinsei Osaka Chiiki no Toshi to Noson [Farm Villages and Cities of the Early Modern Osaka 
Region], in KINSEi OSAKA CHIIKI NO SHITEKI BUNSEKI (HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
EARLY MODERN OSAKA REGION] 295, 304 (Osamu Wakita ed., 1980). Other sources place 
the peak in the 1750s and at about 400,000. See, e.g., Dom, supra note 6, at 18. If Wakita's 
figures are accurate, litigation rates in 18th-century Osaka (in 1785, about 43 suits per 1,000 
population) were far higher than those in most contemporary United States jurisdictions. 
See Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know 
(and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. 
REV. 4 (1983). 
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But note the sudden drop in suits in 1785 following the discontinu­
ance of the shogunate dispute resolution system in 1784. Contempo­
raneous accounts state that the system's 1784 discontinuance occurred 
because the shogunate, with limited resources, was unable to keep up 
with the demand for dispute resolution services.130 To the extent that 
such accounts are correct, the shogunate's response is nonetheless in­
teresting. Instead of devoting more governmental resources to the 
pressing problem of solving disputes, the shogunate apparently aban­
doned the system altogether. 
The shogunate's abandonment of the system, the debatable ab­
sence of a sustained increase in post-1773 litigation (to the extent sug­
gested by the data), or both, might be explained by the quality of sho­
gunate legal rules. Like other Tokugawa coalitions, Dojima 
"performed important functions for the Tokugawa economy as well, 
the most important of which was the establishment of rules for mer­
cantile practices. Because the government did not establish a body of 
customary law to enforce business transactions, [coalitions] were 
forced to do so by themselves."131 It is unclear the extent to which 
shogunate courts would have applied customary law in trading cases at 
the end of the eighteenth century. To the extent that shogunate courts 
did not apply customary law and were thus less predictable than a 
conciliation committee's application of Dojima internal rules,132 plain­
tiffs would likely have preferred to bring suit in shogunate court only 
in cases in which the Dojima conciliation committee would have ruled 
against them.133 To the extent that Tokugawa courts did apply cus­
tomary law (as they often did in commercial cases ),134 assuming that 
they applied it the same way as private courts, trader disputants would 
likely be no better off in court than before the exchange conciliation 
committee. Perhaps some traders rationally preferred to rely on fa­
miliar private internal institutions rather than public legal ones with 
which they had little experience. Perh�ps some traders could receive 
more favorable judgments in one court than another, perhaps because 
of institutional factors, or perhaps because the systems were rigged 
one way or another. Whatever the case, while it may generally be 
130. See OFUREGAKI TENMEI SHOSEI [COMPILATION OF TENMEI PERIOD 
ORDINANCES (1781-1789)], supra note 123, at 837-38; see also SAKUDO, supra note 12, at 
370. 
131. Matao Miyamoto, The Development of Business Associations in Prewar Japan, in 
TRADE ASSOCIATIONS IN BUSINESS HISTORY 7 (Hiroaki Yamazaki & Matao Miyamoto 
eds., 1988); see also OKAZAKI, supra note 118; 
132. Dan Henderson finds that the general philosophy of Tokugawa courts was that 
"[r]eason is significantly superior to customary law." HENDERSON, supra note 23, at 58-59. 
133. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 
J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). In the Japanese context, see J. MARK RAMSEYER & MINORU 
NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 92-95 (1999). 
134. See, e.g., OKAZAKI, supra note 118, at 71. 
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preferable for public lawmakers to provide default rules rather than 
mandatory ones,135 giving plaintiffs a forum-shopping option at 
Dojima likely reduced the predictability of dispute resolution. 
C. Comparing the Two Systems 
The shogunate announced and implemented its reverse-course de­
cision to allow suits based on trading at Dojima on designated "suing 
days" in 1773. If privately ordered internal rules were functioning ef­
ficiently, the decision should not have drastically altered market ar­
rangements. Although the effect on litigation rates is unclear, market 
institutions remained intact after 1773. The discontinuance of the 
edict after only twelve years also calls into question the efficacy of the 
shogunate courts. We can also look to five more precise measures to 
determine the effect of the decree: price trends, trading volume, spot­
futures correlation, volatility, and price.136 
First, it is useful simply to eyeball 1773 price changes, as shown in 
Figure 5 above (Section III.B). 1773 appears to be a relatively normal 
year, with relatively normal price fluctuations and price convergence 
at the end of each trading period. It also corresponds to the average 
seasonal price changes depicted in Figure 3. 
Second, I attempted to compare trading volume for the pre-edict 
period and the edict period. Trading volume should give some general 
indication of the extent to which the shogunate's decision increased 
trading efficiency - traders might be less likely to trade in an ineffi­
cient market.137 Volume data listing either actual amount of rice 
traded at Dojima or the number of contracts traded at regular inter­
vals are not available. But as a substitute, for the period from 1763 to 
1780, the House of Fuji manuscript lists on a monthly basis the num­
ber of bales (each about two bushels) of rice on which Osaka ware­
houses initially issued rice bills.138 
Admittedly, there are problems with using bill issuance as a proxy 
for volume. Because many rice receipts bore no relation to the issuing 
warehouse's actual inventory, Dojima traders effectively traded con­
tracts, not rice, and accordingly measuring the size of rice bills may be 
somewhat artificial. Second, some of these rice bills were merely un­
backed bonds not traded at Dojima. Still, assuming that these factors 
135. See Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1752 
(1996). 
136. The latter two variables I examine at the suggestion of Omri Yadlin. An event 
study to calculate abnormal returns based on the 1773 edict would be probative, but the data 
are too scarce for such a study. 
137. Of course, because ofDojima's futures trading monopoly, the only legal alternative 
to futures trading at Dojima is not trading futures. 
138. Average = 3,797,840; standard deviation = 293,081.2. 
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remained relatively constant during the period in question, the data 
might still provide some general hints as to whether and how Ex­
change trading volume was affected by the edict. Figure 7 shows the 
annual totals of rice bills issued by volume as recorded in the House of 
Fuji manuscript. 
Figure 7: Size of Rice Bills Issued (Trading Volume) 
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During the pre-edict period (1763-1772), in which traders solved 
their own disputes, warehouses wrote rice bills for an annual average 
of 3,883,891 bales of rice.139 During the time of the edict in which fu­
tures contracts were enforceable (beginning in 1773 and ending with 
the end of data in 1780), rice bill volume fell to 3,690,276 bales of rice, 
a drop of nearly five percent, and never once climbed above 4 mil­
lion.140 But if the pre-edict period of comparison is not 1763-1772, but 
the shorter period 1768-1772, the edict actually brought about a 3.6% 
increase and volume of 3,800,000 bales for the first time in four years. 
These findings would tend to support claims of efficient regulation. 
The data are so noisy, however, that it is difficult to come to a firm 
conclusion regarding the effect of the edict on volume measures. 
Third, I compared the annual average correlations of spot and fu­
tures prices. As Section III.B suggests, correlations are biased up­
ward, as prices converge at the end of each term, but this calculation 
should nevertheless provide a comparative measure of how useful fu­
tures were as a hedging device before (1761-1772), during (1773-1784), 
and after (1785-1796) the edict. As Table 3 shows, the average annual 
correlation between spot and forward prices was greater during the 
139. Standard deviation = 305,362.1. 
140. Standard deviation = 254,788.7. 
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pre-edict period than during the period in which the edict was en­
forced. 
TABLE 3: EDICT PERIOD COMPARISONS 
Annual Average Volatility Price Correlation of 
Legal Status141 Volume Spot and Fu-
tures Prices Spot Futures Spot Futures 
Pre-Edict: 3,883,891 .912 .06516 .06149 61.478 61.121 Dojima Courts Bales 
Edict Shogu- 3,690,276 nate and Dojima Bales .883 .06702 .06207 57.755 57.480 Courts 
Post-Edict Unavailable .754 .06615 .06053 67.790 65.402 Dojima Courts 
Of course, factors other than the edict may have been responsible 
for the lower correlation of spot and futures prices, and the correlation 
in the pre-edict period may have been so high that there was little 
room for increase by the edict. Thus, while interesting that the best 
measure of the price discovery function did not increase during the pe­
riod in which contracts were legally enforceable, the analysis is at best 
uncertain. 
Fourth, I compared the volatility of spot and futures prices before, 
during, and after the edict, by calculating the standard deviation of 
logarithmic price differences, or geometric returns.142 The results of 
annual average log-volatility calculations for the three periods are re­
ported in Table 3.143 As the table shows, the differences among the 
141. For volume, the periods are pre-edict 1763-1772 and edict 1773-1780, as limited by 
the available data. For correlation, volatility, and price, I used equal eleven-year periods: 
pre-edict 1761-1772, edict 1773-1784, and post-edict 1785-1796. Using the full dataset for 
these periods results in pre-edict {1755-1772) correlation of .924 and post-edict (1785-1827) 
correlation of .807. Removing the Great Tenmei Famine period raises the edict period cor­
relation to .898 and the post-edict correlation to .817. Using the full dataset for volatility 
results in pre-edict (1755-1772) log-volatility of spots .06286 and futures .06061, and post­
edict log-volatility of spots .08404 and futures .07954. Using the full dataset for price results 
in a pre-edict (1755-1772) average spot price of 60.911 and average futures price of 61.367, 
and a post-edict (1785-1827) spot price of 61.364 and futures price of 61.034. 
142. Standard deviation, which I mistakenly reported in an early draft of this Article, is 
an inappropriate and inaccurate measure of volatility because, among other things, it as­
sumes a normal price distribution in which negative prices could exist. See Glyn A. Holton, 
Time: The Second Dimension of Risk, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Nov./Dec. 1992, at 38. 
143. Because these figures may be affected by the Great Tenmei Famine (1783-1787), I 
also calculated log-volatilities designating the edict period as ending in 1782, and designating 
the post-edict period as beginning in 1788. The figures for the 1773-1782 period are spots, 
.06705; futures, .06178. The figures for the 1788-1827 period are spots, .07977; futures, 
.07484. I also calculated volatility at five-year intervals, with the following results: 1768· 
1772, spots, .06456; futures, .05903; 1773-1777, spots, .07015; futures, .06604; 1778-1782, spots, 
.07377; futures, .07167. 
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periods are small and insignificant, suggesting that the edict did not re­
sult in a more stable market.144 Still, the correlation to the edict period 
does not necessarily indicate causation. 
Finally, I compared average prices before, during, and after the 
edict. As seen in Table 3, spot and futures prices were lower during 
the edict than in the period before and after. How exactly to interpret 
that fact is unclear. Regardless of economic efficien�y, high rice prices 
might indicate that the shogunate accomplished its stated goal of rais­
ing those prices, while low prices might suggest policy failure.145 But 
price differences may have been attributable to several complex fac­
tors, including lower risk or increased rice supply. One likely explana­
tion is simply that prices were lower during the period for a wide range 
of goods, and rice was no exception. The House of Mitsui kept de­
tailed records for much of the relevant period of consumer good 
prices, including rice, soy bean paste, soy sauce, sake, and lamp oil in 
Kyoto, the former capital city located about 25 miles from Dojima.146 
Using these House of Mitsui data, E.S. Crawcour and Kozo 
Yamamura calculated a price index for the contiguous period 1773-
1817.147 Although the data are not equally complete for all commodi­
ties, this Kyoto price index indicates a steep decline in average prices 
from 1773 to 1783. 1780 and 1781 index prices were the lowest in the 
entire dataset, and edict years represent five of the six lowest rice 
prices in the dataset. Not surprisingly, regression analysis indicates a 
statistically significant relationship between futures prices and the 
Kyoto price index (r = .650, t = 2.02, p = .048). 
In short, there is no strong evidence that allowing suits in shogu­
nate courts had a positive impact on various measures of market per­
formance. Nor is there strong evidence of adverse consequences of 
state intervention. My hunch - and given the nature of the data it is 
difficult to offer substantially more - is that the combination of public 
and private dispute resolution mechanisms was not as good as, and 
certainly no better than, the private one. I find that conclusion mar­
ginally more persuasive given the data, and two fora for dispute reso­
lution are likely to be less predictable than one. Moreover, as David 
Chamy argues, legal intervention can improve transactors' welfare 
when transactors have limited information, or when the law enforces 
terms that transactors would have placed into contracts in the absence 
144. See generally Robert J. Shiller, The Use of Volatility Measures in Assessing Market 
Efficiency, 36 J. FIN. 291 (1981). 
145. See supra text accompanying notes 38-42. 
146. See KINSEI KOKI NI OKERU SHUYO BUKKA NO DOTAI [MOVEMENTS OF MAJOR 
COMMODITY PRICES DURING THE LATE TOKUGAWA PERIOD] 68-72 (Nobuhiko Nakai ed., 
1952). 
147. See Crawcour & Yamamura, supra note 60, at 27-28. 
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of high drafting costs.148 While I acknowledge the inherent circularity 
here of theory and empirics, it is at least clear that whatever problems 
Dojima traders may have faced, they did not appear to face problems 
of limited information or high drafting costs in those areas of at­
tempted state regulation.149 Little changed in either Dojima contracts 
or Dojima institutions after 1773,150 suggesting that whatever informa­
tional or drafting problems traders may have had, making contracts 
legally enforceable did not solve them. 
CONCLUSION 
Most commercial markets and institutions of the Tokugawa feudal 
period did not survive the 1868 Meiji Restoration that began shortly 
after Japan was opened to the West. Increased foreign goods and for­
eign traders, as well as increased production of Japanese goods for 
foreign markets, disrupted long-established trading patterns. The 
Osaka economy was "in turmoil," financial institutions dissolved, and 
currency value was uncertain.151 In 1869, the new imperial government 
abolished the Dojima Rice Exchange and all other "transactions in 
differences," which it now labeled gambling, as had been done in the 
West.152 But as in seventeenth-century Japan, early eighteenth­
century England, and late eighteenth-century New York, nineteenth­
century Japanese rice merchants continued to trade secretly in the ab­
sence of law. In 1871 the government granted a petition submitted by 
traders to reopen the market.153 Dojima subsequently continued as a 
quasi-governmental organization (1881-1887), and then as a for-profit 
corporation that charged its members dues (1887-1939),154 until war­
time controls forced Dojima to cease operation. All that remains of 
the Exchange today is a monument that, appropriately enough, re­
sembles a gravestone. 
At the hands of government bureaucrats, Dojima died a somewhat 
ungraceful death. But for nearly 300 years, it remained a central insti-
148. See Charny, supra note 5, at 433-35; see also Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5; 
Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Nonns, with Special Refer­
ence to Sanctions, 19 INT'LREV. L. & ECON. 369, 381 (1999). 
149. Perhaps state laws to address issues not addressed well by traders, such as nation­
wide trading or long-term contracting, might have been more successful. 
150. See, e.g., SHIMAMOTO, supra note 6, at 1. 
151. See MASAYUKI TSUGAWA, OSAKA DOJIMA KOME SHOKAUO NO KENKYO [A 
STUDY OFTHEDOJIMA RICE MARKET] 6-26 (1990). 
152. Zensaku Sano & Sentaro Iura, Commodity Exchanges in Japan, 155 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 223, 228 (1931). 
153. See, e.g., y AMATANE GROUP KlNEN SHUPPANKAI, supra note 31, at 130-31. 
154. See OSAKA DOJIMA SHOKAUO KlSOKU [OSAKA DOJIMA RICE MARKET RULES] 2 
(Kuninlatsu Miyamoto ed., 1880), microformed on 4DM48902 (capitalized at 75,000 yen with 
750 shares and formally established officers); Sano & Iura,supra note 152, at 225, 230. 
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tution of the Japanese economy. Whatever problems Dojima may 
have had, it was apparently efficient enough to squelch strong de­
mands for reorganization. As this Article has shown, one of the rea­
sons for its success - whether measured solely by longevity or by the 
more formal methods detailed herein - was likely its system of pri­
vately ordered rules and organizational constraints. The shadow of 
the law was always present. But anecdotal information and price data 
indicate that Dojima functioned for centuries in accordance with mod­
em theories of efficient markets without direct government interven­
tion or strict regulation. The data from the shogunate's 1773 experi­
ment in public dispute resolution are more ambiguous, but they 
certainly do not present a strong case for government intervention. 
